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MORAL DISCOURSE AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
FAMILY LAW 
Carl E. Schneider* 
Family law has undergone momentous change in recent decades. In 
this Article, Professor Schneider proposes that the transformation in fam-
ily law can be understood as a diminution in the law's discourse in moral 
terms about the relations between family members and as a transfer of 
moral decisions from the law to the people the law once regulated. Profes-
sor Schneider identifies countertrends and limits to the changes he de-
scribes, and then investigates the reasons for the changes. He hypothesizes 
that four forces helped change family law and moral discourse within 
family law: the legal tradition of noninte,ference in family affairs; the 
ideology of liberal individualism,· American society's changing moral be-
lieft,· and the rise of "psychologic man," which is a shorthand way of 
describing a host of changes in the way law and society view humans and 
human relationships. Using Roe v. Wade as a case study, he explores the 
consequences of these four forces for family law. Finally, Professor 
Schneider suggests fruitful avenues through which the changes could be 
further investigated. 
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I. INTROIT 
To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at the present possessors of 
power, to lament the past, to conceive extravagant hopes of the future, 
are the common dispositions of the greatest part of mankind. . 
- Edmund Burke 
Thoughts on the Cause 
of the Present Discontents (1770) 
A. The Subject: Family Law and Moral Thought 
American family law has been twice transformed. The first trans-
formation occurred in the nineteenth century, when a family law an-
swering a narrow range of questions about the legal (primarily 
property) relations of husbands and wives was gradually replaced by a 
family law that increasingly ordered relations between husband and 
wife, that increasingly dealt with the termination of those relations, 
and that increasingly spoke to the relations between parent and child 
and between the state and the child. The breadth of this first transfor-
mation may be seen in the extraordinary range of family-law subjects 
that either originated or were wholly reformed in the nineteenth cen-
tury: the law governing marriage formalities, divorce, alimony, mari-
tal property, the division of marital property, child custody, adoption, 
child support, child abuse and neglect, contraception, and abortion. 1 
Family law's second transformation has occurred primarily in the 
last two decades, although its roots run deep. How this transforma-
tion might be characterized is part of the subject of this paper, but that 
family law has once again been transformed can hardly be doubted. 
With the possible (and uninteresting) exception of the law governing 
marriage formalities, every one of the areas listed in the preceding par-
agraph has changed or is changing significantly, and further areas, like 
family torts and immunities, might be added to the list. 
Dramatic as this transformation is, it resists description. In what 
terms, through what lens, might one begin to analyze it? It might, for 
example, usefully be seen as a shift away from public standards to 
private ordering.2 It might, for example, be understood as a response 
to changing gender roles and the women's movement. These and 
other approaches are worthwhile, and will, I hope and expect, soon be 
1. The first history of nineteenth century family law has only recently been published. It is 
M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CEN-
TURY AMERICA (1985). 
2. Cf. Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repu-
diation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429 (1982) (exploring the public/private dichotomy in American 
politics and academic thought). 
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pursued.3 In this paper, however, I propose as a fruitful area of gener-
alization the relationship between morals and family law, for few ap-
proaches offer so clear an insight into "the ends which the several 
rules [of family law] seek to accomplish" or "the reasons why those 
ends are desired. "4 This is true for several reasons. 
First, while morals and law need not coincide, any law must cope 
with the way the people it regulates regard their moral relations. This 
is particularly true of family law: moral issues are central to family 
life and family self-governance, and hence central to the context in 
which family law operates. Indeed, "morality" in its narrowest mean-
ing but commonest usage connotes exclusively one aspect of family 
morality - sexual morality. Moral issues arise specially often in the 
family, where their effect can be specially momentous and their resolu-
tion specially hard. For in marrying we take responsibilities for the 
welfare and happiness of someone who, trusting our assurances, has 
trusted that welfare and happiness to us; and in having children, we 
take responsibilities for the welfare and happiness - even the exist-
ence - of people who must trust that welfare and happiness to us. No 
morality is learned so early and in so compelling a situation as the 
morality of family life, and thus no other morality seems as axiomatic, 
is felt as passionately, so fixes the behavior we exact of ourselves and 
expect of others. Yet hardly any other morality contends with con-
trary impulses and temptations so strong, so ingenious, so insistent. 
Nor are the family's moral problems wholly internal: the family as a 
basic social institution takes responsibilities for the nurture, education, 
and protection of society's new members (and its old). 
Second, while morals and law need not coincide, the moral views 
of citizens and of lawmakers shape, properly, their opinions about the 
law. Once again, this is specially true of family law. Because people 
have tenacious and passionate beliefs about family morals, because 
many people believe that law should vindicate right in matters so im-
portant, moral principles are deliberately and expressly incorporated 
in statute and case law. And for these same reasons, moral sentiments 
influence lawmakers unawares. 
Third, moral issues command special attention from family law 
because the law typically intervenes in the family precisely when press-
ing moral problems arise. Furthermore, family law is one of the rare 
areas of law that tries - in child-custody decisions, for instance - to 
take into account people's entire moral personalities. And family law, 
3. See Schneider, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American Family 
Law, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 1039 (1985). 
4. o.w. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 198 {1920), 
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more than most law, encounters crippling problems of enforcement 
when its rules mismatch popular morals. 
Fourth, the relationship between morals and family law merits at-
tention because American views about morals, especially family 
morals, have changed abundantly. We need to know how thorough-
going those changes are and how they have influenced our thinking 
and our family law, in order that we may eventually ask how desirable 
those changes are and how far they should affect family law. 
Finally, let me put the case for studying family law and moral dis-
course from a somewhat different perspective. Legal scholarship has 
lost its method; or, to be more accurate, it is overwhelmed by an em-
barrassment of methods. Many of these methods - principally the 
"law ands" - attract us because they offer fresh pictures of how law 
works and new tools with which to study it. But as we walk toward 
the blessing of more particular understandings, we walk away from 
the blessing of more general ones. There is, of course, a tradition of 
synoptic writing about society, a tradition that attempts to understand 
how and to what end society's parts do and should fit together.5 Ev-
eryone is deterred from writing in that tradition because no one is 
competent in every area of social inquiry. But law is history, it is the 
regulator of markets, it is the very product of politics, it is the object of 
philosophy, it is an expression of society and a social institution itself. 
If to be a legal academic is to be an amateur historian, political scien-
tist, philosopher, sociologist, and anthropologist, we need manageable 
ways of doing the unmanageable. That, I believe, is a virtue of study-
ing moral discourse in family law: it is a narrow window through 
which to glimpse law in its broadest context. 
B. The Hypothesis 
We come now to the first formulation of my hypothesis. Four 
forces in American institutions and culture have shaped modern fam-
ily law. They are the legal tradition of noninterference in family af-
fairs, the ideology of liberal individualism, American society's 
changing moral beliefs, and the rise of "psychologic man." These 
forces have occasioned a crucial change: a diminution of the law's 
discourse in moral terms about the relations between family members, 
S. A modern example avowedly in that tradition, and directly relevant to the subject of this 
article, is R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & s. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE 
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (198S) [hereinafter cited as 
HABITS OF THE HEART]. The Appendix, Social Science and Public Philosophy, at 297-307, de-
scribes and defends that tradition. The book was published just as this article was completed. 
Had it been published earlier, I would have relied on it often, for it treats ably many of the 
themes I discuss here. 
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and the transfer of many moral decisions from the law to the people 
the law once regulated. I do not mean that this change is complete or 
will ever be completed. I do not suppose that it is occurring in every 
aspect of family law, or everywhere in the country with equal speed. I 
emphasize that there are other trends, and that there is a considered 
and considerable reaction to the trend impelled by a revived conserva-
tism and a politicized fundamentalism. But I do suggest that the 
change is widespread jurisdictionally, institutionally, and doctrinally; 
that it is deep-seated; and that it is transforming family law. 
In this paper, I will initially describe that change in order to 
demonstrate its strength and its scope. Then, since no area of law 
flows in a single uninterrupted stream, I will describe some of the ed-
dies and cross-currents affecting moral discourse in family law. Next, 
I will explore some of the reasons for the present course of family law, 
hoping that that exploration will also yield a richer sense of the texture 
and complexity of the change. I will, however, postpone to a later 
paper the many troubling questions that family law must answer in 
assessing the wisdom of the change and in deliberating on responses to 
it. 
Before we begin, let me warn against two possible (and related) 
misreadings of my hypothesis. The first stems from the fact that, as 
the word is used colloquially, "morality" is a good thing, and more 
morality is a better thing. Therefore, to say that the law is becoming 
quantitatively "less moral" seems to imply that the law is becoming 
qualitatively less good. In some ways this is perhaps true, but for rea-
sons that are immediately obvious, or will shortly become so, it is in 
other ways surely false. 
The second, closely related, misreading of my hypothesis is what 
might be called the "O tempora, o mores" problem. There is a tradi-
tion millennia old - and long honored in this country - of jeremiads 
against a failing moral order and exhortations to a return to the virtu-
ous past. In light of that tradition, to describe a changing moral order 
risks implying a wish to restore the status quo ante. I do not wish to 
do so: I doubt that you can go home again, and even if you could, I 
doubt you would enjoy it. 
IL THE STATEMENT OF THE THEME 
A. The Transformation of Family Law 
Now and then it is possible to observe the moral life in process of revis-
ing itself, perhaps by reducing the emphasis it formerly placed upon one 
or another of its elements, perhaps by inventing and adding to itself a 
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new element, some mode of conduct or of feeling which hitherto it had 
not regarded as essential to virtue. 
- Lionel Trilling 
Sincerity and Authenticity (1972) 
I have said that the tendency toward diminished moral discourse 
and transferred moral responsibility in family law is widespread, and I 
will now attempt to prove that proposition by briefly surveying family 
law. The survey will reveal that, in virtually every area of family law, 
this tendency has made itself felt; that in most areas, the tendency is a 
considerable one; and that in many areas, it is prepotent. 
I. The Law Surrounding Divorce 
Divorce is among the clearest examples of the change I discern. 
For over a century, divorce law reflected and sought to enforce soci-
ety's sense of the proper moral relations between husband and wife. 
Indeed, the law of divorce was virtually the only law that spoke di-
rectly or systematically to an ideal of marital relations. 6 That ideal 
included duties of life-long mutual responsibility and fidelity from 
which a spouse could be relieved, roughly speaking, only upon the 
serious breach of a moral duty by the other spouse. In the last two 
decades, however, every state7 has statutorily8 permitted some kind of 
no-fault divorce. These reforms exemplify the trend I hypothesize be-
cause (I) they represent a deliberate decision that the morality of each 
divorce is too delicate and complex for public, impersonal, and adver-
sarial discussion; (2) they represent a decision that the moral standard 
of life-long fidelity ought no longer be publicly enforced; and (3) they 
represent a decision to diminish the extent of mutual spousal responsi-
bility that will be governmentally required. 
It is, of course, true that no-fault divorce rests in part on a moral 
view about the relations of people to each other and about the proper 
scope of government influence over people's lives. Thus I am far from 
suggesting that the decision to adopt no-fault divorce was itself amoral 
6. Of course, most states impose a duty of spousal support, either through the doctrine of 
necessaries, family-expense statutes, or, occasionally, the criminal law. VA. CODE §§ 20-61 
(1983). These provisions are, however, generally useless to the unsupported spouse and of inter-
est primarily to creditors. See Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 MICH. L. REV. 
1767 (1984). Nor will courts generally enforce the support obligation in the absence of an actual 
separation. McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953). Insofar as this area of 
law has recently changed, it has been in the direction of gender neutrality. 
7. 1985 Survey of American Family Law, 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3015 (1985) [hereinafter 
cited as 1985 Survey]. 
8. Cf. Figueroa Ferrer v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 107 P.R. Dec. 250 (1978), 4 FAM. 
L. REP. (BNA) 2744, which holds that the "right of privacy or intimacy" protected by the 
Puerto Rican constitution guarantees access to no-fault divorce. 
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or immoral. Rather, my point is that, before no-fault divorce, a court 
discussed a petition for divorce in moral terms; after no-fault divorce, 
such a petition did not have to be discussed in moral terms. Before no-
fault divorce, the law stated a view of the moral prerequisites to di-
vorce; after no-fault divorce, the law is best seen as stating no view on 
the subject. Before no-fault divorce, the law retained for itself much of 
the responsibility for the moral choice whether to divorce; after no-
fault, most of that responsibility was transferred to the husband and 
_.;c. 9 
wue. 
The availability of no-fault divorce does not eliminate all the possi-
ble moral questions to be resolved when couples separate; judicial de-
cisions concerning alimony or maintenance, marital-property division, 
and child custody and support all may raise such questions. The ten-
dency in each of those areas is likewise toward diminished moral dis-
course. This trend in alimony law is in part caused by a significant 
change described in the preceding paragraph - namely, the decline in 
the belief that each spouse assumes lifelong responsibility for the 
other. This change has strengthened the disinclination of both courts 
and legislatures to award alimony for life ( or until the remarriage of 
the recipient), may have led to an increased disinclination to award 
alimony at all, and has led to a preference for "rehabilitative" alimony 
(i.e., to awarding alimony only for "the time necessary to acquire suffi-
cient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to 
find appropriate employment.")1° Further, just as legislatures relieved 
courts of the responsibility of evaluating the moral relationship of peti-
tioners for divorce, so are they increasingly relieving courts of that 
responsibility for petitioners for alimony. 11 Even when legislatures 
have not expressly done so, many courts have inferred from their 
state's no-fault divorce statute a legislative intent to eliminate consid-
erations of marital fault in setting alimony. 12 An analogous movement 
9. See Part II. C. infra for further treatment of the argument that, because a moral basis for 
the changes described in this Part can be found, moral discourse in the law cannot have dimin-
ished. See Part IV. infra for an extended demonstration that the changes I describe here cannot 
comfortably be subsumed under any single new moral view of family life. 
10. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(b)(2), 9A U.L.A. 160 (1979). 
11. 1985 Survey, supra note 7, at 3015, 3017 (1985). The Uniform Marriage and Divorce 
Act, for example, provides that maintenance "shall be in amounts and for periods of time the 
court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct. . . . " UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
Acr § 308(b), 9A U.L.A. 160 (1979). 
12. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972). This inference may 
reveal something about judicial as well as legislative attitudes, since the inference is surely not 
compelled. Fault was eliminated as a basis for divorce partly because it was thought that people 
could not usefully be made to live together if they did not want to, whatever their moral relation-
ship. However, in deciding what financial obligations the parties continue to have to each other 
after the marriage is ended, enforcement problems become less severe and the moral relationship 
may well be relevant. Indeed, that relevance seems to be conceded by the usual direction to the 
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may be seen in the treatment of marital property upon divorce; both 
statute and case law increasingly require courts to ignore marital 
fault. 13 
In child-custody law, moral discourse has been reduced by the leg-
islative and judicial erosion as proper bases for decision of various is-
sues of morality, particularly sexual morality, such as nonmarital 
cohabitation14 and homosexuality, 15 which were once thought rele-
vant. Thus the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (a "barometer of 
enlightened legal opinion")16 provides, "The court shall not consider 
conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to 
the child."17 As the Commissioner's Note explains, "This provision 
makes it clear that unless a contestant is able to prove that the parent's 
behavior in fact affects his relationship to the child (a standard which 
could seldom be met if the parent's behavior has been circumspect or 
unknown to the child), evidence of such behavior is irrelevant."18 
Further, legislatures and courts have, by limiting discussion to the 
psychological well-being of the child, tried to close off the considera-
tion of morals and values that the "best interests of the child" stan-
dard once seemed to invite. Thus the Uniform Marriage and Divorce 
Act, while requiring a court determining child custody to "consider all 
relevant factors," expressly mentions (besides the wishes of the child 
and his parents) the child's "interaction and interrelationship" with 
any relevant persons, the child's "adjustment to his home, school, and 
community," and the "mental and physical health" of all concerned.19 
court to make whatever distribution of property and income may be thought to be "right,'' or 
•~ustifiable," or "equitable." It may be true that another reason for no-fault divorce was legisla-
tive reluctance to exacerbate the tensions between the parties by discussing painful subjects, but 
such discussions as to alimony should have fewer consequences, given that divorce has already 
been decided on. Indeed, to ignore the moral relationship between the parties in setting alimony 
awards can itself exacerbate tensions. Further, as Professor Miiller-Freienfels points out, "there 
are more possibilities, in practice, of mitigating fault, and reducing its impact, so as to permit 
compromises" when dealing with alimony. Miiller-Freienfels, The Marriage Law Reform of 
1976 in the Federal Republic of Germany, 28 INTL. & CoMP. L.Q. 184, 195 (1979). 
13. 1985 Survey, supra note 7, at 3021-26. 
14. See, e.g., Kesseler v. Kesseler, 236 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Sparks v. Sparks, 29 
Utah 2d 263,508 P.2d 531 (1973); Wildermuth v. Wildermuth, 14 Wash. App. 442,542 P.2d 463 
(1975). 
15. Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 452 N.E.2d 293 (1983). 
16. Note, Fornication, Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 77 MICH. L. REv. 252,292 (1978) 
[Ed. note: Professor Schneider is the author of this Note.]. 
17. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197 (1979). 
18. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197 Commissioners' Note 
(1979). 
19. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197 (1979). For a justification 
and elaboration of this development, see Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody 
Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984). 
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2. The Law Surrounding Support Obligations 
Developments relevant to my thesis in the child-support area 
center on the survival of the belief in the parent's obligation to support 
the child during the child's minority. While my thesis would predict 
that that belief was waning, there is evidence to the contrary. For 
example, there has been much attention to and legislation for enforc-
ing child support duties.20 Some legislatures and courts have ex-
panded the legally imposed parental support duty to include the 
support of children through college21 and even law school.22 On the 
other hand, in this area the law's actual practice may be as telling as 
its enunciated principle, and even that principle is ambivalently re-
garded. As Professor Chambers reports, "In the United States in 
1975, of five million mothers living with minor children and divorced, 
separated, remarried, or never married, only about one-fourth received 
child support payments of any kind during the year and, of those who 
received anything, fewer than half received thirty dollars or more a 
week."23 From this fact, from the low rate of visitation by noncus-
todial fathers,24 and from the increasing discontinuity of family ar-
rangements, Professor Chambers predicts that legislatures might 
someday limit child-support obligations (and court-enforced visitation 
rights) to a short term, perhaps three or four years. He believes this 
change may be foreshadowed by the willingness of states "to recognize 
more explicitly the right of couples to agree by contract to vary other-
wise applicable obligations of support,"25 and he speculates that 
"[c]hild-support may come to be viewed in much the same way [as 
20. See, e.g., Child Support Enforcement Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 1984 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1305; UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT 
Acr, described at 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4017 (1978); D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 
(1979) (an illuminating study of Michigan's comparatively effective system and a proposal for a 
national system for deducting support payments from wages); H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN 
AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (1981); THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION: 
REsEARCH, PRACTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY (J. Cassetty ed. 1983). 
21. An Illinois statute, for instance, provides: "The Court also may [upon divorce] make 
such provision for the education and maintenance of the child or children, whether of minor or 
majority age, out of the property of either or both of its parents as equity may require •... " 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, ~ 513 (1983). The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the statute in 
Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 III. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978). 
22. Ross v. Ross, 167 N.J. Super. 441, 400 A.2d 1233 (Passaic County Ct. 1979). 
23. Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICH. L. REV. 
1614, 1623 (1982) (footnote omitted). 
24. He notes, for example, that "fifty-two percent of [the children living with their mothers 
after divorce] had ... not had contact with their father in at least a year." Id. at 1624. On the 
other hand, there is evidence that attitudes may be changing: "divorced fathers now seem to be 
much more involved with their children, more concerned about their personal relationship with 
them .... " J. VEROFF, E. DOUVAN & R. KULKA, THE INNER AMERICAN: A SELF-POR· 
TRAIT FROM 1957 TO 1976, 241 (1981) [hereinafter cited as J. VEROFF]. 
25. Chambers, supra note 23, at 1629. 
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rehabilitative alimony]: aid during a period of transition until the cus-
todial parent can achieve financial independence or enter a new rela-
tionship."26 He also observes that the increasing availability and 
acceptability of abortion and birth control may lead to a time when "a 
pregnant woman, not living with the father, who knows that the father 
has no desire to participate in the child's upbringing may be seen [in 
not aborting a child] as making a unilateral decision to bear a child 
and the responsibility for its birth and for raising it may be seen as 
hers alone."27 Two factors enhance this possibility: society's sense of 
a public responsibility to support children whose parents cannot sup-
port them,28 and the fact that the "[p]rivate law support obligations 
for spouses and children that remain rest less on ideas of moral and 
natural duty than they do on utilitarian notions."29 
The rise of public provision for the indigent, especially through 
Social Security, promoted a change in the law's moral impositions in 
another area related to support. Statutes were once common whose 
object was "to protect the public from loss occasioned by neglect of a 
moral or natural duty imposed on individuals,"30 namely, the duty of 
adults to support parents or grandparents who cannot support them-
selves. Such statutes are now decreasingly common and are evidently 
rarely enforced.3 1 
Marital responsibilities may be said to have diminished in yet an-
other respect. The law was once, and to a considerable extent still is, 
26. Id. at 1633. 
27. Id. at 1619 (footnote omitted). Men have tried to escape child support obligations on 
such grounds, but with one temporary exception they have failed. See, e.g., People ex rel. S.P.B., 
651 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1982). The exception is the bizarre case of the "celebrity" an airline stew-
ardess chose to be the father of her child. "[O]n the crucial night, which followed a long separa-
tion, he asked [her] before they had sexual intercourse what she was doing in regard to 
contraception, and she replied [falsely] that she was 'on the pill.'" Pamela P. v. Frank S., 110 
Misc. 2d 978, 979, 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981). The well-known family court 
judge, Nanette Dembitz, held that, under Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947), this fraud in the 
conception "interfered with respondent's right of free choice regarding procreation," 110 Misc. 
2d at 983, to such an extent that he should be relieved of any support obligation beyond that 
necessary to assure that "the child's fair and reasonable needs can ... be met.'' 110 Misc. 2d at 
985. Connoisseurs of legal novelty will be saddened to learn that, on appeal, the New York 
Court of Appeals rejected the family court's holding. 59 N.Y.2d 1, 462 N.Y.S.2d 819, 449 
N.E.2d 713 (1983). 
28. Grants to States for Aid to Dependent Children, Title IV of the Social Security Act, Pub. 
L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620, 627-28 (1935). 
29. M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 80 (1981). 
30. Illinois v. Hill, 163 III. 186, 191, 46 N.E. 796, 798 (1896). 
31. As late as 1956, family responsibility statutes existed in 38 states. Mandelker, Family 
Responsibility Under the American Poor Laws: I. 54 MICH. L. REV. 497, 497 n.1 (1956). In 
1980, only 27 states had such laws. Garrett, Filial Responsibility Laws, 18 J. FAM. L. 793, 813 
n.103 (1980). See M. GLENDON, supra note 29, at 49-50. This type of statute has been chal-
lenged, though unsuccessfully, on equal protection grounds. Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 
490, 516 P.2d 840, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1973). 
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that a couple cannot contract to reduce the marital duties imposed by 
law. 32 An exception to this rule has long been made for pre- and post-
nuptial contracts respecting property.33 Now, a second exception, fos-
tered by both courts and legislatures, is developing that allows couples 
to agree to some nonproperty divorce terms. This modest34 increase in 
freedom to contract represents a slackening of legal attempts to regu-
late moral conduct, but, like most grants of freedom to contract, is not 
an unambiguous withdrawal from private affairs by the state: With 
the right to contract comes judicial supervision and interpretation of 
the conti:act, and that authority can provide judges with the opportu-
nity to impose their own moral views. This judicial authority is exer-
cised with special zeal in supervising contracts concerning obligations 
after divorce. Courts commonly require that the parties must either 
have made a fair agreement or must have understood both the eco-
nomic circumstances of the other party and any rights waived in mak-
ing the agreement. 35 
3. The Law Surrounding Nonmarital Relations 
Changes in the law of nonmarital contracts likewise reveal a 
marked alteration in the law's moral viewpoint. It was once "well 
settled that neither a court oflaw nor a court of equity will lend its aid 
to either party to a contract founded upon an illegal or immoral con-
sideration, "36 and thus that "[a]n agreement in consideration of future 
illicit cohabitation between the plaintiffs is void."37 In the celebrated 
Marvin38 case, however, the California Supreme Court discovered that 
California had always used "a narrower and more precise standard: a 
contract between nonmarital partners is unenforceable only to the ex-
tent that it explicitly rests upon the immoral and illicit consideration of 
meretricious sexual services."39 The court offered to enforce oral con-
tracts and contracts implied in fact, and it enticingly declined to "pre-
clude the evolution of additional equitable remedies to protect the 
expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship in cases in 
32. French v. McAnamey, 195 N.E. 714 (Mass. 1935). 
33. Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 10 CALIF. L. 
REV. 204 (1982). 
34. "Modest" at least in the sense that much remains that cannot be the subject of legally 
enforced private contracting: i.e., nonproperty aspects of an ongoing marriage. 
35. E.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962). 
36. Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977) (emphasis in original). 
37. Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 Ill. 229, 249 (1882), quoted in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 
1204, 1208 (Ill. 1979). 
38. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). 
39. 18 Cal. 3d at 669, 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821 (emphasis in original). 
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which existing remedies may prove inadequate."40 Other states have 
widely, though not universally, followed suit. This approach, in effect 
if not precisely in terms, removes from judicial consideration a moral 
question - whether a relationship is so offensive to morals that the 
state should decline to enforce contracts respecting it. However, here· 
even more than in marital contracts, the elimination of one moral con-
sideration could create more. This would be true even if judges 
needed do no more than supervise and interpret express written con-
tracts; it would be truer if judges dealt only with implied contracts; it 
will be very true indeed if judges are actually to devise standards for 
"additional equitable remedies" even where no implied contract is 
found. This visitation of the law into the moral lives of the unmarried 
seems particularly piquant in view of the likelihood that they stay un-
married in part to avoid the legal consequences of marriage.41 
4. The Law Surrounding Abuse of Children 
The contraction of moral discourse in the law of child abuse and 
neglect may be illustrated by beginning with Joseph Story: 
[P]arents are intrusted with the custody of the persons, and the educa-
tion, of their children; yet this is done upon the natural presumption, 
that the children will be properly taken care of, and will be brought up 
with a due education in literature, and morals, and religion; and that 
they will be treated with kindness and affection. But, whenever . . . a 
father . . . acts in a manner injurious to the morals or interests of his 
children; in every such case, the Court of Chancery will interfere 
42 
Until recently, child abuse and neglect statutes used similarly broad 
criteria for legal intervention. Georgia's statute, for instance, still au-
thorizes legal intervention on behalf of any child "without proper pa-
rental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or 
other care or control necessary for his physical, mental or emotional 
health or morals."43 And child-welfare officials and courts long inter-
vened exactly in aid of a child's presumed moral welfare.44 The pres-
ent trend of influential opinion is to define grounds for intervention 
specifically and narrowly so that the state may act only when the child 
40. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832 n.25. 
41. Indeed, the opinion has been criticized on just this ground. Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. 
Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 937 (1977). 
42. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE§ 1341 (3d ed. 1843). 
43. GA. CODE§ 15-11-2(8)(A) (1985) (defining "deprived child"). Legal intervention on be-
half of a deprived child is authorized under§ 15-11-34. 
44. A notorious example is In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 2d 260, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1967). 
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suffers or risks severe physical or mental injury.45 Supporters of that 
approach urge it in part precisely because it lessens intervention on 
"moral" grounds: 
[A]ll intervention involves value judgments about appropriate childrear-
ing practices and value choices about where and how a child should 
grow up. Considering the seriousness of the decision to intervene, inter-
vention should be permissible only where there is a clear-cut decision, 
openly and deliberately made by responsible political bodies, that that 
type of harm involved justifies intervention. Such value judgments 
should not be left to the individual tastes of hundreds of nonaccountable 
decisionmakers. 46 
Moral discourse about child abuse has diminished in another way. 
There has for some time been a tendency to discuss that issue not in 
moral, but in medical terms. In recent decades, many social issues 
have undergone such a shift. The shift in language about child abuse 
has been specially marked, however, because various kinds of experts 
- psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers - have directly in-
fluenced the statutory, judicial, and administrative discourse about 
child abuse.47 
In the related area of child medical care, the direction of change is 
somewhat obscure, partly because there are few reported cases save 
those in which a parent has refused a child medical treatment for reli-
gious reasons. The paucity of cases may itself indicate the law's appre-
hension of the mine field of moral issues that questions of child 
medical care, and particularly questions of neonatal euthanasia, pres-
ent. The dearth of cases seems especially significant since the inci-
dence of legally consequential child medical care problems appears to 
have increased with recent advances in perinatal care and since public 
discussion about and awareness of those problems has certainly 
increased.48 
Rationales for the law's reluctance to encounter the moral dilem-
mas of child medical care have been propounded emphatically in the 
45. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION JUVENILE 
JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT, Standards 
1.3.A; 2.1 (1981). 
46. Id. at Standard 1.3 commentary. 
47. Weisberg, The "Discovery" of Sexual Abuse: Experts' Role in Legal Policy Formulation, 
18 U.C.D. L. REv. 1 (1984). As Weisberg points out, the last few years have seen a resurgence of 
moral language into legal discourse about child abuse. See Part V. infra. 
48. See, e.g., Mnookin, Two Puzzles, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 667; C. Schneider, A Response to 
Two Puzzles (unpublished manuscript); Should Uncle Sam Protect Handicapped Babies? U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 16, 1984, at 63. At this writing, the success of the Reagan adminis-
tration's attempts - including its "Baby Doe" regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 14878, 14887-89 (April 
15, 1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. section 1340.15) - to bring these questions into legal 
discourse remains uncertain. 
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legal literature,49 and that reluctance has been demonstrated and ar-
ticulated judicially in, for example, In re Phillip B.50 In that case, the 
state of California sought a court order compelling heart surgery for a 
twelve-year-old boy with Down's Syndrome who had been institution-
alized from birth. The state contended that without the operation, his 
lungs would deteriorate, the consequent lack of oxygen would so ener-
vate him that he would live from bed to chair, and he would die 
within, at the outermost, twenty years. The risk of mortality from the 
surgery was no more than five or ten percent; Phillip's father "ex-
pressed no reluctance in the hypothetical case of surgery for his other 
two sons if they had the 'same problem,' justifying the distinction on 
the basis of Phillip's retardation."51 In a brief opinion the court de-
clined to order the operation, since, 
Inherent in the preference for parental autonomy is a commitment to 
diverse lifestyles, including the right of parents to raise their children as 
they think best. Legal judgments regarding the value of childrearing 
patterns should be kept to a minimum so long as the child is afforded the 
best available opportunity to fulfill his potential in society.52 
5. The Law Surrounding Sexual Relations and Reproduction 
In a series of areas, the law's moral discourse has been restricted by 
narrower definitions of immorality. Perhaps the first change was in 
the law's treatment of contraception. In the late nineteenth century 
and into the twentieth century, dissemination of information about 
contraception was limited by both state and federal statute. In the 
1920s and 1930s, an active and successful birth-control movement 
arose, and as contraception went "from private vice to public virtue," 
such statutes were repealed. 53 The Supreme Court fired the coups de 
grace when, in Griswold v. Connecticut54 and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 55 it 
49. The rationales have been set forth perhaps most emphatically in Goldstein, Medical Care 
for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977). 
50. 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 
(1980). 
51. Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 418 n.9, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 787 n.9 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983). "Evidence established that Phillip, with a recently tested I.Q. score of 57 
. . . is a highly functioning Down's Syndrome child capable of learning sufficient basic and em-
ployable skills to live independently or semi-independently in a non-institutional setting." 139 
Cal. App. 3d at 419, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 788. 
52. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). In 
a subsequent proceeding, a couple who had, through volunteer work, come to know Phillip 
sought and won appointment as guardians of his person and estate. Guardianship of Phillip B., 
139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). The operation has since been 
successfully performed. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1983, at A12, col. 1. 
53. J. REED, FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC VIRTUE (1978). 
54. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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held that state regulations limiting access to contraception infringe the 
constitutional right to privacy. 
A slower but still pronounced change has characterized laws 
prohibiting fornication, cohabitation, and adultery. While all states 
once had such statutes, fewer than a third have them now, and states 
that have not repealed them seem to enforce them rarely or sporadi-
cally. 56 Although several Supreme Court Justices have said in dicta 
that such statutes are constitutional, 57 the Court has never ruled on 
the question, and some commentators have argued58 and some courts 
have held59 to the contrary. 
Laws against homosexuality may be in an earlier stage of a similar 
process. Although the Supreme Court summarily and delphically af-
firmed a lower-court ruling refusing to find Virginia's sodomy statute 
unconstitutional, 60 a number of state courts have held that such stat-
utes infringe the right of privacy,61 and a number of states and towns 
have written antidiscrimination statutes or ordinances protecting 
homosexuals. 62 
The law's rescue from the moral difficulties of abortion was more 
abrupt. In the 1960s and early 1970s, a reform movement began to 
persuade state legislatures, most notably New York's, to liberalize 
abortion statutes. In 1973, however, the Supreme Court preempted 
that movement by holding in Roe v. Wade 63 that women have a con-
stitutional right to an abortion free from state regulation in the first 
55. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Two shots were needed because the Court missed the first time, See 
notes 199-202 infra and accompanying text. 
56. See Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabi-
tation, 1981 WIS. L. REv. 275, 284; Note, supra note 16. One also sees cases involving public 
employees who have been penalized for unmarried cohabitation. E.g., Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie 
Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977), affd., 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1052 (1978). 
57. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 718 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
58. E.g., Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); Note, supra 
note 16. 
59. State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 
415 A.2d 47 (1980). 
60. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), ajfd. mem., 425 
U.S. 901 (1976). 
61. E.g., State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 
434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. 
Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980). 
62. E.g., PALO ALTO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE§ 2.22.050 (1969); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN,, CODE 
OF ORDINANCES ch. 945 (1975); SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 102,562 (1973); Wis. STAT. 
§§ 101.22, 111.31-32(13m) (1981-82); ANN ARBOR, MICH., ORDINANCE CODE ch.112 § 9.150-
51(13) (1980); DETROIT, MICH., CODE§§ 7-1004,1005 (1984). 
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an extended discussion of Roe, see text at notes 229-58 infra. 
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trimester of pregnancy, and a right to an abortion under limited state 
regulation in the second trimester. Roe neatly exemplifies the diminu-
tion of moral discourse: it removed a major moral question from the 
law, 64 and did so at a remarkable and revealing moment - exactly 
when debate about abortion in legislatures was developing vigorously 
and productively, and when judicial debate was too recent and un-
formed to give the Court the kind of guidance it ordinarily relies on. 65 
Roe exemplifies just as neatly the law's tendency to transfer moral de-
cisions to the people the law once regulated, for Roe apparently rested 
partly on the belief that the pregnant woman could better make the 
moral decisions about abortion than the state, a belief the Court has 
carried to the point of protecting a "competent" minor's power to de-
cide to have an abortion without parental guidance. 66 
6. Conclusion 
This brief and allusive survey of family law illustrates how broad 
and deep the trend toward diminished moral discourse and transferred 
moral responsibility is. In the rest of this Part, I shall suggest two 
additional ways of analyzing the trend, shall deal with objections to 
my formulation of it, and shall attempt to articulate some of its 
complexities. 
B. Two Amplifications of the Hypothesis 
All systems of ethics, no matter what their substantive content, can be 
divided into two main groups. There is the "heroic" ethic, which im-
poses on men demands of principle to which they are generally not able 
to do justice, except at the high points of their lives, but which serve as 
signposts pointing the way for man's endless striving. Or there is the 
"ethic of the mean," which is content to accept man's everyday "nature" 
as setting a maximum for the demands which can be made. 
-Max Weber 
Letter to Edgar Jaffe (1907) 
I have described a series of doctrinal developments that support 
the hypothesis that moral discourse in family law has diminished and 
that responsibility for moral decisions has been transferred from the 
64. R. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTERESr OF CHILDREN 244-46 (1985). Roe did leave to the 
traditional later day several subsidiary legal and moral issues. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). And oppo-
nents of abortion have pressed their view, often successfully, by all the legislative means left open 
to them. 
65. Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the Pre-Roe Case Law, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1724 
(1979), reprinted in THE LAW AND PoLmcs OF ABORTION 158 (C. Schneider & M. Vinovskis 
eds. 1980). 
66. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
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law. This description not only supports that hypothesis; it also allows 
us to amplify it, for there has been an associated change in the nature 
of the moral discourse - namely, a change away from aspirational 
morality. The family law we inherited from the nineteenth century 
sought not just to regulate family life, but to set a standard of behavior 
not readily attainable. That law enunciated and sought to enforce an 
ideal of lifelong marital fidelity and responsibility. Attempts to dimin-
ish the responsibilities of one spouse to the other were denied legal 
force by prohibitions against altering the state-imposed terms of the 
marriage contract. Divorce was discouraged, was justified primarily 
by serious misconduct by a spouse, and was available only to the inno-
cent. Marital responsibility in the form of alimony continued even 
where the marriage itself had ended. The old family law also enunci-
ated what might be called an ascetic ideal. Sexual restraint in various 
forms was a prominent part of this ideal. Laws prohibiting fornica-
tion, cohabitation, and adultery confined sexual relations to marriage; 
laws declining to enforce contracts based on meretricious considera-
tion and laws giving relief in tort for interference with the marital rela-
tionship sought to achieve the same effect indirectly. Sexual relations 
were confined to monogamous marriage by laws prohibiting polygamy 
and to exogamous marriage by laws prohibiting incest. Sexual rela-
tions were confined to conventional heterosexuality by sodomy laws. 
And laws regulating the sale of contraceptives and the use of abortions 
made the "risks" of normal sexual relations difficult to avoid. Sexual 
restraint, wp.ile central, was not the only feature of the law's ascetic 
ideal. That ideal also included, through child-custody law, a view of 
"good moral character" that valued the diligent, law-abiding, church-
going citizen. 
Modem family law, as this survey suggests, not only rejects some 
of the old standards as meaningless, undesirable, or wrong; it also hesi-
tates to set standards that cannot readily be enforced or that go be-
yond the minimal responsibility expressed in the cant phrase, "Do 
your own thing, as long as you don't hurt anybody else. " 67 The stan-
dard embodied in that phrase, with its emphasis on its first clause, is 
emphatically not aspirational; that standard can instill neither the in-
spiration nor the empathy to encourage people to anticipate ways in 
which their conduct might be harmful, much less to shape their con-
duct so that it is actively helpful. 
My survey of family law suggests a second amplification of my 
67. The legal changes surveyed exhibit a common tendency to remove from the law rules not 
justified in terms of preventing palpable harm to particular individuals; that is, those rules whose 
sole justification is "morality" have become rarer. 
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hypothesis. I have had to discuss the trend toward diminished moral 
discourse as though it were entirely disembodied, as though it had no 
social, economic, or political origins. Legal scholarship's unfortunate 
ignorance of the politics of family law, the numerous and complex 
origins of the posited trend, and the limited scope of this paper inhibit 
precision, and therefore I proffer only a limited working hypothesis. I 
hypothesize that the trend toward diminished moral discourse in fam-
ily law is most actively promoted by lawyers, judges, and legal schol-
ars who are, relative to the state legislators and judges who would 
otherwise decide family law questions, affluent, educated, and elite. 
This group's views on family law questions are (relatively) liberal, sec-
u1ar, modern, and noninterventionist. Some confirmation of this hy-
pothesis may be found in public opinion surveys that suggest that 
"community leaders" and members of the "legal elite" consistently 
have more liberal attitudes on family law questions than the "mass 
public."68 And it does seem likely, for instance, that judicial receptiv-
ity to unmarried cohabitation stems in part from the fact that judges' 
sons and daughters are members of one of the two groups in which 
nonmarital cohabitation is most common. 69 Indeed, a good deal of 
change in family law may be attributable to the encounter of an upper-
middle class whose mores are changing with traditional legal regula-
tion of divorce, abortion, and contraception, and to the response of a 
more feminist upper-middle class to the law's failure to prevent spouse 
abuse, nonpayment of alimony, and inequitable allocation of marital 
property.70 
68. H. MCCLOSKEY & A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BE-
LIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 171-231 (1983). The authors of this study define "community 
leaders" and "legal elite" vaguely, but since in each case they are speaking only of local elites, 
and since their sample underrepresented poorer and less-educated members of the public, their 
study probably understates the class, professional, and institutional differences on family law 
questions. 
Further confirmation of the hypothesis that class affects views about family law issues comes 
from Professor Kristin Luker's fascinating study of pro- and anti-abortion activists, K. LUKER, 
ABORTION AND THE PoLmCS OF MOTHERHOOD (1983). She finds: "On almost every social 
background variable we examined, pro-life and pro-choice women differed dramatically." Id. at 
194. The former tended to be middle-middle class, the latter upper-middle class. She concludes 
that the debate over abortion has become a vehicle for debating class-based differences over the 
role of women and motherhood in society: "Protecting the life of the embryo, which is by defini-
tion an entity whose social worth is all yet to come, means protecting others who feel that they 
may be defined as having low social worth .... " Id. at 207. Pro-life people "see an achieve-
ment-based world as harshly superficial, and ultimately ruthless. . . . Pro-life people have rela-
tively fewer official achievements in part because they have been doing what they see as a moral 
task, namely, raising children and making a home .... " Id. at 207. See also G. PEELE, REVI-
VAL AND REACTION (1984). 
69. The two groups are urban young adults with many years of education and urban young 
adults who spent few years in school. A. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 13-14 
(1981). 
70. As Professor Lempert hypothesizes: ''[W]here the moral desirability of a law is not self-
evident to most people, the probability that the law will be effectively repealed will vary directly with 
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This hypothesis may help us glimpse some of the complexity of the 
trend toward diminished moral discourse. While a number of the de-
velopments I have described - the Supreme Court's privacy decisions 
for example - clearly reduce moral discourse by eliminating or limit-
ing important moral issues as bases for legal decision, legal (and polit-
ical) discussion of some version of these issues has sometimes 
persisted. In general, however, such discussion has been relegated to 
those legal and political institutions that are relatively less "elite" (and 
that are relatively more accessible to their lower-middle-class constitu-
ents). And insofar as such discussion occurs in "elite" legal and polit-
ical institutions - resistance to the Court's abortion decision is a 
prime example - we may expect those institutions to be divided along 
the class and cultural lines I have described. Professor Fineman sug-
gests an analogue to this process in her valuable and intriguing study 
of Wisconsin's cohabitation statute, which she finds is differentially 
enforced depending on local police and prosecutors' sense of the moral 
views of their particular communities. 71 
C. Some Complexities and Some Definitions 
1. Some Complexities 
All scholarship is subject to at least one temptation - the tempta-
tion to devise a single hypothesis to explain all, or most, of a field. 
Even a scholar who modestly proposes a limited hypothesis will be 
read as imposing an unlimited one. But the truth, as Oscar Wilde 
said, "is rarely pure and never simple."72 Nothing important can be 
explained in terms of a single factor, and even attempts to weight once 
and for all the many features of a phenomenon always fail. Thus my 
hypotheses, while important, are not intended to describe or explain 
all of family law. In this section, then, I shall limn some of the com-
plexities of those hypotheses. 
A central complexity is that the "trend" I describe is not a typical 
"trend," for moral discourse in family law is not diminishing entirely, 
or even largely, because of a deliberate decision that it should do so. 
Unlike, for example, the trend in the 1960s toward greater procedural 
rights for defendants in criminal cases, this trend is not entirely caused 
by people who self-consciously favor it. Rather, many of the policies 
the social status of those identified as violators of the law," and "the moral desirability of a law is 
less likely to appear self-evident to most people the higher the perceived social status of those idellti• 
fled as violators of the law." Lempert, Toward a Theory of Decriminalization, 3 ET AL. I, 5 (1974) 
(emphasis in original). 
71. Fineman, supra note 56, at 287-96. 
72. 0. Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest, Act I. 
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that perpetuate the trend were adopted for reasons thought sufficient 
in themselves quite apart from their consequences for moral discourse. 
True, moral discourse has in some areas been diminished and moral 
responsibility has in some respects been transferred because of a con-
sidered choice to relieve the law of moral discourse or because of a 
considered opinion that individuals will make better decisions than the 
state. But the trend has many other sources. Moral discourse has di-
minished, for example, because of a constriction in the category of acts 
considered immoral, because of changes in society's view of the nature 
of one person's responsibility for another, because of society's dimin-
ished sense of ability to enforce family law, and because of an uncon-
sidered and unnoticed change in the nature of the language courts and 
legislatures use. 
A sense of the complexities that the word "trend" tries to organize 
may be won by examining the consequences of obeying a common first 
impulse - my own first impulse - when confronted with a topic like 
mine: namely, the impulse to think in terms of "moral images" of the 
family in the law.73 On consideration, though, the unwisdom of doing 
so becomes clear: There is no "law" that presents "a moral image" of 
"the family." It is instructive to consider why. 
First, the United States has thousands of different legal institu-
tions, each capable of generating its own legal doctrines and hence its 
own moral image of the family.74 The three major jurisdictional levels 
- federal, state, and local - each have different responsibilities for 
and perspectives on families.75 Further, each jurisdiction normally 
has three branches of government - legislative, judicial, and executive 
- each, again, with its own responsibilities for and perspectives on 
families. 76 And, yet further, there are within the executive and judici-
ary several different levels, each able to write (at least until corrected 
by a higher level) binding law, and each, again, with its own responsi-
bilities for and perspectives on the family. Within the judicial branch, 
73. Cf. CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY (V. Tufte & B. Myerhotf eds. 1979). 
74. See generally Engel, Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives on a Civil 
Trial Court, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 425 (exploring legal pluralism in American 
society). 
75. While local jurisdictions make little family law, they make some, as when they define 
"family" for zoning purposes. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding 
unconstitutional a local zoning ordinance defining "family" to include households in which 
grandmothers lived with grandchildren who were siblings, but to exclude households in which 
grandmothers lived with grandchildren who were cousins). Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 
416 U.S. 1 (1974) (holding constitutional a local zoning ordinance defining "family" to exclude 
households of more than two unrelated people). 
76. While the executive does not by itself make family "laws," it does write family "rules," as 
when the Social Security Administration makes regulations amplifying on the statutory definition 
of "dependent," or when a police department tells its officers how to handle domestic quarrels. 
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for example, are trial and appellate courts. Trial judges commonly 
differ in ability and temperament from appellate judges, trial judges 
and appellate judges work under different time pressures, trial judges 
confront the litigants and the whole record while appellate judges con-
front only isolated issues of law, and so on. For that matter, many 
family law disputes are handled by a specialized branch of the trial 
bench - a family court, juvenile court, or probate court - which, like 
all specialized institutions, has its own careers, customs, and 
convictions. 
Thus the first problem with describing the law's moral image of the 
family lies in the multiplicity and diversity of legal institutions. The 
second problem lies in the multiplicity and ambiguity of legal doc-
trines. Even a single level of a single branch of government in a single 
jurisdiction commonly produces legal doctrines in many areas of the 
law. One difficulty, then, will be that of isolating those doctrines that 
speak to family problems: there is no body of law that everyone agrees 
is "family law." Although most law schools offer a course called 
"family law," and although many states compile statutes under the 
rubric of "domestic relations," those phrases have no uniform content. 
Moreover, some kinds of law - tax codes, for example, or the statute 
establishing the Federal Housing Administration - are not "family 
law," but so affect families that they must be considered when investi-
gating the law's view of the family. 
Another difficulty will be that those legal doctrines that concern 
the family will present different images, and different moral images, of 
it. Even law that is undeniably "family" law rarely treats "the family" 
as a whole. Rather family law is divided in two - the law of husband 
and wife, and the law of parent and child - and each part is doctri-
nally fragmented. Nor is this surprising: different areas of the law 
generally have histories of their own, operate on logic of their own, 
respond to interest groups of their own, and move at paces of their 
own.77 
A third difficulty will be that, even were there doctrinal consis-
tency, different moral images of the family may be presented by articu-
lated doctrine and by the law in practice. Because family ·1aw defers 
many crucial and complex questions to unguided or faintly guided ju-
77. For example, the law of most jurisdictions declines to interfere in parents' decisions about 
where their children shall live, even if the parents have solicited legal intervention by entering 
into a contract on the subject. The law declines because it assumes that parents will do their best 
to make wise decisions for their children and that the parents' best will usually be better than the 
law's. See, e.g., In re Polovchak, 97 Ill. 2d 212, 223, 454 N.E.2d 258, 262 (1983), cert. denied, 
104 S. Ct. 1413 (1984). Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions a court may override even a joint 
parental decision as to where the children shall live if that court is presiding over the parents' 
divorce. Eg., CAL. C1v. CODE §§ 4600.5(a), 4608 (West. supp. 1985). 
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dicial discretion,78 unarticulated rules of thumb are common.79 Prin-
ciple and practice also differ in those many areas of family law in 
which legal principle lags behind social principle or practice, as during 
those long years in England when adultery was the only ground for 
divorce, and perjured testimony won many divorces. so 
Not only will articulated principle and actual practice present dif-
ferent images, but actual practice - how courts and lawyers resolve 
disputes - will present different images from perceived practice -
how courts and lawyers think they resolve disputes.81 This in tum will 
affect actual practice in, for example, that vast majority of cases that 
are never litigated or are settled by consent of the parties, for in those 
cases the parties may have received legal advice based on false impres-
sions of actual practice. 
Yet another difficulty will lie in identifying the moral viewpoint 
even of legal doctrine that undoubtedly speaks to the family. A single 
legal doctrine, as any student of the common law knows, can often be 
justified on several moral grounds. One might look to the law's ex-
pressed moral justification, but "the law" presents fewer opportunities 
for such justification than one would suppose. Statutes, of course, 
need not justify themselves and indeed sometimes cannot, since they 
may be compromises of incompatible moral purposes. Legislative his-
tories often are not made, are sketchy, or proffer only a jumble of testi-
mony from various interested parties. Even judicial opinions often 
78. The division of marital property under such provisions as that of the Uniform Marriage 
and Divorce Act, UN!F. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 307(a), 9A U.L.A. 143 (1979) (requir-
ing that courts "equitably apportion" the property of the husband and wife taking into account a 
long list of undefined factors) and the award of child custody under the "best interests of the 
child" standard are two major examples. 
79. For example, Michigan child support law asks divorce court judges to make whatever 
decrees they "deem just and proper concerning the . . . maintenance of the minor children of the 
parties." MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 552.16 (1979). One might infer that the legislature intended to 
require judges to amass and assess the special facts of each case and devise an order tailored to 
those facts. However, as Professor Chambers reports, "In nearly all Michigan counties, the 
judges . . . rely on a locally devised schedule that fixes the orders of support in relation to two 
factors only: the number of children in the family and the net earnings (after taxes and Social 
Security) of the noncustodial parent." D. CHAMBERS, supra note 20, at 39. 
80. For an engaging and influential illustration of this phenomenon, see A. HERBERT, HOLY 
DEADLOCK (1934). And of course the English example had many American counterparts. See, 
e.g., H. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES 20-25 (1963); Engel, supra note 74, 
at 444-51. 
81. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make 
a Difference?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141 (1980). 
Note further that the image perceived by lawyers and the image perceived by the laity often 
diverge, as I am reminded by the alarmed silence and nervous titter when I tell my family law 
class that "open and notorious cohabitation" is, in Michigan, a crime punishable by one year in 
the county jail. For a discussion of such differences in perception, see Engel, supra note 74, at 
444-51. 
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speak only in terms of statutory language, legal precedent, and doctri-
nal logic. 
Finally, just as there is no "law" that presents "a moral image," so 
also is there no "family." Rather, there have always been many kinds 
of families, a fact the law reflects and even helps cause. For instance, 
Professor Bloomfield argues that antebellum law distinguished repeat-
edly between indigent and nonindigent families, 82 a number of states 
now treat unmarried couples like a new hybrid whose partners are 
neither "married" nor single, 83 the Supreme Court presses states to 
treat illegitimate children as though they were legitimate, 84 and the 
law has created a new form of family through foster-parent 
programs. 85 
Thus the number and kind of problems with describing the law's 
moral image of the family suggest that we might better search, not for 
the law's moral image of the family, but rather for the law's moral 
discourse, between institutions, over time, about families. This formu-
lation, I believe, describes the inquiry somewhat more precisely. It 
sensitizes us to the multiplicity of voices that speak about the law's 
relationship to families' morals, to the likelihood of conflict between 
those voices, and to the certainty of change as the discourse develops. 
It may also sensitize us to the intricacies, contradictions, and continu-
ities in "the law's" discourse with "society" about these questions. 
2. Some Definitions 
I have said that "the law" has tended to eliminate "discourse" 
about the "moral" relations of family members. What do I mean by 
these words? 
"Law" has come to have a broad meaning, has come to be under-
stood as "generic and protean, found in many settings, not uniquely 
associated with the state or with a clearly organized political commu-
nity."86 And a broad definition of law may be specially apt when dis-
cussing law and the family. 87 However, to keep this paper 
manageable, and because I am particularly interested in the relation-
82. M. BLOOMFIELD, The Family in Antebellum Law, in AMERICAN LA WYERS IN A 
CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, 91 (1976). 
83. See text at notes 36-41 supra. 
84. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1973). 
85. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 
(1977). 
86. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE 
LAW 12 (1978). 
87. · For example, there is a large body of church law (ranging from informal to highly for-
mal) that greatly influences the way many families live. 
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ship between the family and the state, I define "the law" to include 
only law promulgated by governmental institutions. And while, even 
thus limited, "the law" is, as we have just seen, greatly complex, I 
shall for simplicity's sake speak of "the law" as if it were univocal. 
"Discourse" is similarly problematic. By legal discourse I refer to 
the ways the law expresses ideas, both among legal institutions and 
between legal institutions and the people and social institutions the 
law wishes to affect. The discourse that I will explore is primarily of 
two kinds: first, the use by courts or legislatures of moral language 
and ideas, and second, the prohibition of conduct on moral grounds. 
The latter category raises questions about whether the law's failure to 
prohibit conduct also is part of moral discourse. While sensitivity is 
necessary to the times this is true, I suspect that the law's silence more 
often indicates the law's inattention, indecision, or indifference. 
The most troublesome definitional problem lies in the word 
"moral." In some sense every legal decision is a "moral" decision. 
For instance, one might say that a resolution of a legal issue in terms 
of economic efficiency is also a resolution in moral terms, since there is 
available a moral basis for resolving legal issues on economic grounds. 
And, on a principle of the conservation of moral energy, one might say 
that there can never be a diminution of moral discourse because every 
decision not to discuss an issue in moral terms is itself a moral deci-
sion. Nevertheless, legal actors and those they govern distinguish be-
tween decisions made on moral grounds and decisions made on social, 
economic, psychological, or "legal" grounds. That these distinctions 
will sometimes break down and will always blur at the edges does not 
mean that the distinctions are useless, that different bases for decision 
will not lead to different results, or that decisions justified in different 
terms will not be differently received by those affected. 
The differences between these kinds of decisions may be illustrated 
by the various rationales for prohibiting incest. A decision made on 
moral grounds turns on whether particular conduct is "right" or 
"wrong," whether it accords with the obligations owed other people or 
oneself. Incest might be prohibited on moral grounds because it is 
instinct with coercion or because it violates natural or divine law 
which prescribes standards of right and wrong. A decision made on 
psychological grounds turns on whether particular conduct promotes 
psychological health. Incest might be prohibited on psychological 
grounds because the prohibition eases resolution of the Oedipal con-
flict. A decision made on social grounds turns on whether particular 
conduct promotes the effective functioning of society as a whole. In-
cest might be prohibited on social grounds because "the prohibition of 
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incest establishes a mutual dependency between families, compelling 
them, in order to perpetuate themselves, to give rise to new fami-
lies."88 A decision made on economic grounds turns on whether par-
ticular conduct promotes economic efficiency. Incest might be 
prohibited on economic grounds because such a prohibition, by dis-
couraging endogamy, encourages capital formation. 89 A decision 
made on "legal grounds" turns on whether particular conduct is re-
quired in order to comply with authoritatively promulgated principles. 
A court might enforce a prohibition against incest quite apart from its 
own beliefs about the wisdom of such a prohibition because it believed 
that the legislature intended that such a prohibition be enforced and 
that the decision to prohibit ~uch conduct was constitutionally con-
fided in the legislature. 
In each of these different situations, the governmental actor will 
consult a different rationale and will speak a different language; and 
the people acted upon will understand what has happened in different 
ways. It is, of course, always possible to reach a given result through 
several rationales and with varying language. But in analyzing legal 
problems, we legitimately test the merits of the rationales offered for a 
result, and we properly remember that the way we talk about 
problems can change the way we think about them. In this paper I 
direct attention to changes in the way we talk about and justify mod-
em family law because those changes change the way we think about 
it and act on it. 
Ill. THE THEME INVERTED: Two COUNTER-TRENDS AND 
THEIR LIMITATIONS 
I have suggested that family law has tended to diminish discourse 
about the moral relations of family members and to transfer moral 
decisions, and I have offered instances of that tendency. However, in 
Part II. C., I said that no area of law can be explained in terms of one 
trend and that no trend. of importance lacks counter-trends of impor-
tance. To emphasize this point, and to place the tendency toward di-
minished moral discourse in context, I wish to explore two of its 
leading counter-trends. 
A. The Counter-Trends 
In two areas of the law generally there has been especially active 
discourse about the moral relations between people. The first of these 
88. Levi-Strauss, The Family, in MAN, CULTURE, AND SOCIE1Y 349 (H. Shapiro ed. 1971). 
89. Cf. IT. ZELDIN, FRANCE 1848-1945: AMBITION AND LOVE 287 (1973). 
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is contract law. That field has in recent decades seen, for example, a 
new eagerness to apply the doctrine of unconscionability, a keener 
hostility to contracts of adhesion, a readier eye for contractual liability 
on equitable grounds, and, as in landlord/tenant and labor law, a re-
newed willingness to use status-based ideas to help those the law takes 
to be helpless.90 
The second such field consists of the laws that grew out of the 
intense moralism of the civil rights movement. The purpose of a civil 
rights movement is by definition to alter the rights of citizens vis-a-vis 
their government. However, the larger purpose of our civil rights 
movement - and one of the means of accomplishing the governmen-
tal purpose - was to introduce a morality of equality into everyday 
life: into life at school;9 t in neighborhoods;92 on buses, in department 
stores, and at lunch counters;93 in hotels and restaurants;94 at work,95 
at play,96 and at home.97 Indeed, one tribute to the moral strength of 
that purpose has been the willingness of the law to serve it by ex-
panding the state-action doctrine98 and the commerce clause.99 
Courts making civil rights law have expressly sought to change popu-
lar attitudes by ending "the role-typing society has long imposed."t00 
Significantly, the movement and these legal reforms were resisted pre-
cisely on the grounds that "you can't legislate morality." 
I suggest that these two areas of the law and the social ideas they 
symbolize have contributed elements of waxing enthusiasm for moral 
analysis in family law.tot It is in the areas of family law susceptible to 
90. On the last of these points, see Donahue, Change in the American Law of Landlord and 
Tenant, 37 Moo. L. REv. 242, 258 (1974). 
91. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
92. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
93. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
94. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
95. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983); United 
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, §§ 7017-18, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)). 
96. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam). 
97. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
98. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 
1 (1948); but see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 
v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
99. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
100. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975). 
101. While the discussion that follows treats recent developments, the contributions of the 
egalitarian and contractarian principles did not begin in the last two decades. The current of 
egalitarianism that sprang out of the reordering of family relations in the early nineteenth cen-
tury worked large changes in family law, and family law's anxious and ambivalient relation to 
the contracterian ethos was likewise ·especially marked in that century. See M. GROSSBERG, 
supra note 1. 
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contractual analysis that courts have been most inclined to examine 
the specifics of people's moral relations in search of a fair result. For 
example: courts have sought to reward the expectation interests of 
people who have supported their spouses through school, 102 have 
countenanced contracts (have even been willing to imply contracts) 
between unmarried cohabitants, 103 have begun to allow parties to alter 
the contract of adhesion that is the marriage contract, 104 and have 
closely supervised those alterations to prevent unconscionable con-
tracts.105 The civil rights movement's egalitarian ethos has likewise 
vitalized moral discourse in some parts of family law. That ethos has 
hastened the reform of marital property law, 106 alimony, 107 child-cus-
tody law, 108 grandparents' visitation rights, 109 the doctrine of neces-
saries, 110 and various support requirements. 111 
B. Limits to the Counter-Trends 
However appealing contractarian and egalitarian principles may be 
for family law, there are inherent limits on the capacity of each to 
reverse, or even greatly delay, the trend toward reduced moral dis-
course in family law. Many of these limits grow precisely out of the 
uneasy relationship between the egalitarian ethos and the con-
tractarian ethos. Much of the moral strength and interest of the con-
tractarian ethos is in fact drawn from the egalitarian ethos: 
Traditional contract law achieves its modem attraction by its distinc-
tion from status-based means of social organization; "reformist" con-
tract law achieves its attraction by more realistically assessing the 
original relative situations of the contracting parties. Significantly, 
however, reformist contract law's assessment of the contracting par-
102. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). 
103. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). 
104. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962). 
105. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962) (setting aside antenuptial con-
tract where husband did not disclose the full extent of his assets). 
106. Note, for example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act's various attempts to keep 
the husband's nominal ownership of property from guaranteeing him ownership of it after a 
divorce, including the statute's provision that a court may dispose of property "belonging to 
either or both" and its direction that "the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker" shall be 
considered in dividing property. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307 (Alternative A), 9A 
U.L.A. 96 (1979). 
107. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
108. Consider, for instance, the waning of the tender-years presumption and the increasing 
preference for joint custody. 
109. 1985 Survey, supra note 7, at 3020-21. 
110. See Note, supra note 6. 
111. Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490,511,516 P.2d 840,854, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 
150 (1973) {Tobriner, J., dissenting). 
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ties' situation results in differential treatment of the contracting parties 
based precisely on their status. Thus in landlord/tenant law, to take 
one example, both statute and case law have not only provided system-
atic protections for tenants qua tenants, but have made those protec-
tions unwaiveable. 112 
Although reformist contract law is status-based, it seems, because 
of its commercial nature, status-based in a relatively inoffensive way. 
That law commonly deals with contracts between actors (usually an 
individual and a business) who are of disparate wealth, knowledge, 
and expertise and who have joined in only one kind of transaction 
(usually a rental or sale). Moreover, the fairness of the contract is 
commonly measurable straightforwardly, in economic terms. 113 
In some ways, status-based family-law contracts share the attrac-
tions of their commercial counterparts. Those attractions arise partic-
ularly from the perception that, when the contracting parties are a 
man and a woman, the man is likely to have social and economic ad-
vantages that could affect the ultimate fairness of the contract. But 
there are dissimilarities between the family contract and the commer-
cial contract that limit the former's attractiveness and its capacity to 
expand moral discourse in family law. First, given the large propor-
tion of "relationships" that can usefully be called endogamous, and 
given the changing patterns of women's education and careers, the rel-
ative advantages of the parties to a family contract, especially at the 
time of the contract, are less palpably unequal than the relative advan-
tages of the landlord and tenant or the customer and seller, and any 
inequalities that persist seem likely to diminish. 
Second, and more important, even if we are convinced that the 
bargaining positions of the man and the woman are and will remain 
unequal, it is much harder in the family than the commercial situation 
to know what a fair contract would look like. This is because, unlike 
the commercial contract, the family contract is really about many 
kinds of transactions between the parties, the fairness of which can 
often not be measured in economic terms. 114 Nor does the egalitarian 
ethos provide reliable standards for evaluating or reformulating family 
contracts: Egalitarianism can require the law to shape its doctrines so 
that they do not discriminate between similarly situated parties, but it 
112. Donahue, supra note 90, at 256. 
113. Where the fairness of the contract is problematic, reformist contract law sometimes tries 
to ensure "procedural" fairness. See, e.g., UNIF. CoNSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2-501 to 2-505 
(1968), which provides for a cooling-off period before certain kinds of sales contracts take effect. 
114. This helps explain the insistence of some courts on certain "procedural" practices in the 
formation of antenuptial contracts. See, e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 
1962). 
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cannot readily speak to the many ways in which members of a family 
may be differently situated, either by conduct (where, for instance, a 
spouse has wasted joint assets) or by status (where, for instance, one of 
the parties is incapable of contracting - an impediment that alone 
makes almost the whole of parent/child family law unsusceptible to 
contractual discourse), or, most important, by choice (where the par-
ties have altered their positions by contract). In other words, egalitari-
anism provides only one, partial standard of decision. 
This last factor reminds us that contract law itself sets limits on the 
moral inquiries the law should make, limits so significant that con-
tractarianism is itself an important cause of the trend toward dimin-
ished moral discourse. Contract law embodies a moral preference for 
allowing the contracting parties to arrange their own affairs, a prefer-
ence expressed, for instance, in the doctrines that a court will not in-
vestigate the adequacy of consideration and that a court will interpret 
a contract in light of the intent of the parties. Indeed, just that prefer-
ence accounts for much of the eagerness to introduce contract princi-
ples into family law, 115 and the preference seems specially apt in the 
family context, where people's reasons for choosing "unequal" con-
tracts may be based on deep-seated and well-considered social and reli-
gious views. To the extent that an egalitarian ethos prevails over 
contract law's preference for effectuating the parties' intent, the prob-
lem of legally enforced paternalism will be raised. And that paternal-
ism seems inconsistent with the egalitarian ethos itself.116 
A third relevant difference between commercial and family con-
tracts is that, while we can plausibly encourage parties to a commer-
cial contract to bargain at arm's length, to establish their rights against 
each other in writing in advance, and to enforce those rights in courts, 
the whole contractual approach will seem to many families (and possi-
bly should seem to the law) inimical to good family relations. 117 (In-
deed, it may be inimical to good commercial relations.)118 
Thus, while family law is being transformed by the diminution of 
moral discourse in and the transfer of moral decision from many of its 
fields, there are at least two major sources of resistance to that trend. 
115. See Shultz, supra note 33. Furthermore, if contract law is to be predictable enough to 
be useful (or fair) to those wishing to plan their lives through family contracts, some standard 
limits on judicial rewriting of contracts will be necessary. 
116. Recall that many of the reforms hastened by the egalitarian ethos - reforms of ali-
mony, child-custody, and support law - altered paternalistic protections of women. 
117. Compare Professor Weisbrod's provocative discussion of the difficulties of viewing in 
traditional contract terms the contracts that nineteenth-century utopian communities made with 
their members. C. WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA 186-99 (1980). 
118. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM, Soc. 
REV. 55 (1963). 
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These two sources - contractarianism and egalitarianism - seem, 
however, to be subject to some inherent limitations. In any event, 
their continued influence on family law will depend on the unpredict-
able political future of this country, a subject mercifully outside the 
scope of this paper. 
IV. VARIATIONS ON THE THEME: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE 
CAUSES OF THE TREND 
So far, I have attempted to show that family law is undergoing 
significant change - a trend toward diminished moral discourse and 
toward the transfer of moral decision. I have described that change, 
and I have placed it in the context of countervailing changes. I will 
next examine four features of American life that form yet a broader 
context of this change in family law - the legal tradition of noninter-
ference in the family, the ideology of liberal individualism, society's 
changing moral views, and the rise of psychologic man. I undertake 
this examination for three reasons. 
First, and most simply, I wish to explore the reasons for the 
change. The causes of a trend so extensive and various can never be 
fully understood, but we can at least make a useful start. 
Second, I explicate the trend's origins because the reader might 
otherwise be tempted to dismiss it as merely a feature of one or an-
other of its causes. In particular, the reader might suppose that the 
trend is not away from moral discourse, but toward a morality of lib-
eral individualism. To some degree, I do not find that supposition 
troubling: liberal individualism is so protean that identifying the form 
it has taken in this time and in this place is itself a worthwhile enter-
prise. But to a larger degree, I think that supposition is incorrect: I 
hope that my survey of four of the trend's causes will show that it is, 
rather, an independent phenomenon arising from and sustained by 
several interacting but distinguishable forces. 
Third, I examine the trend's origins to place it in its context and 
thereby make possible a richer sense of its scope and nature than was 
possible in my initial survey of the trend. That sense will, I hope, 
develop as each cause is discussed. But, of course, the causes are intri-
cately related to each other, and the trend cannot be fully perceived by 
looking at its origins in isolation from each other. I therefore have 
selected for specially detailed discussion the rise of psychologic man, 
and I have provided a case study of Roe v. Wade that I hope will give 
a more complex sense of the constituents and dynamics of the rise of 
psychologic man in particular and the trend toward diminished moral 
discourse in general. 
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Useful as I hope this examination of the trend's origins will be, I 
undertake it hesitantly. When we investigate the law's discourse, we 
are asking, to an important extent, about the patterns of speech and 
thought of the lawmakers themselves. These patterns are shaped, of 
course, by formally articulated ideas of many kinds, including legal 
doctrine. But they are also shaped by the ill-defined and unarticulated 
ideas that form popular culture. The obscurity of those ideas, and the 
variety of combinations in which they appear, conceal the ways they 
mold legal attitudes. To put the problem somewhat differently, we 
may observe with some confidence general trends of thought in soci-
ety; we may observe with perhaps a little more confidence general 
trends in law. But unless the match between the two trends is unusu-
ally close, or unless the lawmakers were unusually forthcoming about 
their reasoning and motives, we can rarely say confidently that the 
popular trend "caused" the legal one. In addition, each of the 
"causes" is itself caused by a multitude of deeper causes - urbaniza-
tion, industrialization, the affluence of modem society, the structure 
and needs of post-industrial society, and so on. I acknowledge the 
presence and importance of those deeper causes, but do not address 
them because their generality would make my discussion fruitlessly 
premature. 
Identifying the causes of legal change is problematic enough when 
the change is legislative, but at least legislators often operate in public 
(since they must explain themselves to voters and the press, and since 
pressure on them may be applied directly and overtly), and legislative 
change is a well-studied branch of political science. Judges, however, 
work in secret, pressure on them is indirect, and judicial change is less 
well studied by scholars. Even exegesis of judicial opinions affords few 
reliable insights into the reading or subtler assumptions of judges, if 
only because opinions are often not drafted by judges. Furthermore, 
judges may not be exposed to the same social influences most of the 
world is, even leaving aside the narrowness of the professional stratum 
from which they are generally recruited. The mass of judges, particu-
larly at the upper reaches of the profession, lead lives of quiet prepara-
tion. They are busy, and often spend their days reading briefs, 
motions, and opinions, many of which are on technical questions and 
most of which are prepared by equally busy lawyers. Their work lives 
are isolated; they may see little even of the other judges on their bench; 
they are surrounded by people who cannot afford to offend them. 
Their social lives may be isolated. They are often old when they reach 
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the bench.119 In short, Justice Holmes is an entirely misleading exam-
ple of the judicial type. He had an unusually active intellectual life 
before reaching the bench, his judicial work was less consuming than 
judicial work is today (partly because he was content to write sensibly 
brief opinions), his intellectual life continued while he was a judge, and 
he revealed that life in letters and speeches. We can therefore talk 
about the influences on his thought in ways that we cannot hope to do 
for most jurists. 
A. The Legal Tradition of Noninterference in the Family 
[A] law may bind two members of the community very closely to each 
other; but that law being abolished, they stand asunder. . . . Such, 
however, is not the case with those feelings which are natural to man-
kind. Whenever a law attempts to tutor these feelings in any particular 
manner, it seldom fails to weaken them; by attempting to add to their 
intensity it robs them of some of their elements, for they are never 
stronger than when left to themselves. 
- Alexis de Tocqueville 
Democracy in America (1836) 
[It] is so far from being natural for a man and woman to live in a state of 
marriage, that we find all the motives which they have for remaining in 
that connection, and the restraints which civilised society imposes to pre-
vent separation, are hardly sufficient to keep them together. 
- Samuel Johnson 
Boswell's Life of Johnson (1791) 
Perhaps the oldest impediment to moral discourse in family law is 
the legal tradition of noninterference in the family. That tradition 
rests in large measure on the practical difficulties of enforcing family 
law and the practical consequences of trying to do so. Because of this 
tradition, the moral problems associated with many kinds of family 
disputes do not enter legal discourse. The tradition is an old one, has 
telling rationales, and may be growing in appeal. 
The strength of the tradition of noninterference is attested to by its 
age, 120 by the extreme circumstances in which the law has heeded it, 
and by the multiplicity of reasons for it. Each of these testimonies 
may be illumined by examining the unusually direct, eloquent, and 
119. See generally Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 248 
(1981). 
120. As family law traditions go, this one, because it dates at least to the mid-nineteenth 
century, is quite old. But it is worth recalling that the view of the family as a haven and regard 
for family privacy and autonomy are primarily products of the nineteenth century. Earlier cen-
turies did not perceive clear boundaries between the family and society, and were willing to 
intervene directly in families and to use families to carry out the policies of the state. See gener-
ally L. STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800 (1977). 
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provocative opinion in State v. Rhodes, 121 an 1868 criminal prosecu-
tion of a husband for the assault and battery of his wife. The court 
condemned the evil the husband had done and expressly denied he had 
any "right" to do it. Nevertheless, the court forbade intervention in 
the absence of "permanent or malicious injury" or "intolerable" con-
ditions, since each family has a "domestic government . . . formed for 
themselves, suited to their own peculiar conditions, and . . . supreme, 
and from [which] there is no appeal except in cases of great impor-
tance requiring the strong arm of the law .... " 122 
Several fears underlay the court's holding. First, the court feared 
the burden of dealing with "every trifling family broil."123 Second, it 
feared the complexities of deciding "what would be the standard?" 
Suppose a case coming up to us from a hovel, where neither delicacy of 
sentiment nor refinement of manners is appreciated or known. The par-
ties themselves would be amazed, if they were to be held responsible for 
rudeness or trifling violence. . . . Take a case from the middle class, 
where modesty and purity have their abode but nevertheless have not 
immunity from the frailties of nature, and are sometimes moved by the 
mysteries of passion. . . . Or take a case from the higher ranks, where 
education and culture have so refined nature, that a look cuts like a 
knife, and a word strikes like a hammer; where the most delicate atten-
tion gives pleasure, and the slightest neglect pain; where an indignity is 
disgrace and exposure is ruin. Bring all these cases into court side by 
side, with the same offence charged and the same proof made; and what 
conceivable charge of the court to the jury would be alike appropriate to 
all the cases . . . .124 
Third, the court feared that, once in court, each family member would 
endeavor "to justify himself or herself by criminating the other, [and] 
that which ought to be forgotten in a day, will be remembered for 
life."125 Finally, the court feared "the evils which would result from 
raising the curtain, and exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the 
nursety and the bed chamber."126 
Each of these rationales applies in substance, if not in language or 
in particulars, today. Indeed, although a modem court would be un-
likely to use them to dismiss a criminal prosecution for assault, they 
are regularly used in discussions of how p~lice and prosecutors should 
handle spousal-assault complaints. And, to take an example from the 
civil side, courts commonly use them in declining to intervene in fam-
121. 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868). 
122. 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) at 457-59. 
123. 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) at 458. 
124. 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) at 458-59. 
125. 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) at 457. 
126. 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) at 457. 
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ily disputes even where a husband and wife have by prenuptial agree-
ment solicited intervention.127 
The law not only suspects that intervention will do harm; it doubts 
that intervention will do good: in family law as in few other areas of 
the law, the enforcement problems are ubiquitous and severe. Con-
sider the frustrations of the law's attempts to prevent divorce; to en-
force spousal-support obligations; to compel alimony and child 
support payments; to deter spouse and child abuse; to enforce fornica-
tion, cohabitation, sodomy, and adultery statutes; to regulate the use 
of contraceptives; to prevent abortions;128 to supervise neonatal eutha-
nasia;129 and to enforce visitation rights. Nor is this inefficacy surpris-
ing - the very nature of family law suggests that it should be 
peculiarly and inherently difficult to enforce. 
Enforcement difficulties arise first because much of what family 
law seeks to regulate - from child and spouse abuse to fornication -
occurs in private. The distastefulness of investigating private life is 
sharp enough to have been used to justify the doctrine of constitu-
tional privacy130 and to have contributed to the rise of no-fault di-
vorce. Family privacy is often hard to breach because the parties all 
participated in the violation of law, because they wish to protect those 
who did participate, or because they are ashamed to have people know 
about the incident in which the state is interested. Families may also 
seek to maintain their privacy because they disagree with the law's 
definition of immoral behavior (as the Rhodes court suggested), be-
cause they dislike the law's meddling in family affairs, or because they 
feel the common urge of a family to unite against outside criticism. 
Family law's second enforcement problem is that the person en-
forced against is often specially able to injure the very person the law 
intervened to protect. The spouse who wishes to resist divorce, the 
abused child or spouse, the pregnant woman, and her fetus are all vul-
nerable in this way. Legal intervention in these situations thus may be 
fruitless, or, worse, might provoke the person enforced against to re-
taliate against the person the law wants to protect. Because the person 
to be protected often depends on the person enforced against, even 
legal punishment itself can injure the person to be protected by depriv-
ing him or her of the presence or affection of the other. 
127. Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 107 So. 2d 885 (1958) (declining to consider whether 
to enforce a prenuptial agreement that children of the marriage would be educated in a parflchial 
school). 
128. See Zimring, Of Doctors, Deterrence, and the Dark Figure of Crime - A Note on Abor-
tion in Hawaii, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 699 (1972). 
129. Mnookin, supra note 48, at 667-68. 
130. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965). 
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The third enforcement difficulty arises from the fact that, in many 
critical areas of family law, the people the law wishes to regulate live 
in emotional settings and under psychological pressures which make 
them little susceptible to the law's persuasion or even coercion. None 
of us is immune "from the frailties of nature," and we are all "some-
times moved by the mysteries of passion,"131 but many of those whom 
family law most wants to reach lead lives so distressful they can hardly 
control themselves or their circumstances.132 
In short, the law has long avoided many of the moral issues facing 
families under the authority of the tradition of "nonintervention." 
The bureaucratic and economic capacity of the state to intervene is 
now greater than ever before, and we now have graphic examples of 
the state's power to enforce some family laws.133 Yet the doctrine of 
nonintervention was probably never stronger. Indeed, the very scope 
of the state's capacity makes us anxious to cabin its activities,134 an 
anxiety that has been increased by the more romantic efforts - Prohi-
bition, for instance135 - of our own government to enforce its will, as 
well as by the rise of the modem dictatorship.136 
The tradition of noninterference persists not only because we fear 
the state's power, but also because we doubt the state's efficacy. The 
state's retreat from direct regulation of some areas of family life has 
reinforced the popular belief that "you can't enforce morality." And 
that retreat has encouraged people to believe that family law's ultimate 
goals of permitting, inspiring, and sustaining decent relations between 
husbands and wives and parents and children can be secured - if 
society can secure them - only through comprehensive and costly 
social services and social reform. But the programs such people advo-
cate are so comprehensive and so costly that they are politically ab-
surd.137 Furthermore, there is now a sense that even comprehensive 
131. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 458 (1868). 
132. See, e.g., Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Re-
alistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1021 (1975). 
133. See, e.g., D. CHAMBERS, supra note 20, at 138-61. 
134. Thus in the forebodings of our time's anti-utopias the state is made to use its technologi-
cally extended powers to destroy the family. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); G. 
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949); Y. ZAMYATIN, WE (1920) (English translation pub-
lished 1972). 
135. "If any man supposes that a mere law can turn the taste of a people from ardent spirits 
to malt liquors, he has a most romantic notion oflegislative power." Fisher Ames, quoted in H. 
AsBURY, THE GREAT ILLUSION 28 (1950). 
136. The beginnings of modern fourth amendment jurisprudence, for example, may be traced 
in part to a reaction to European totalitarianism. 
137. For a proposal for such programs, see K. KENISTON & THE CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON 
CHILDREN, ALL OUR CHILDREN 85-211 (1977); but see G. STEINER, THE FUTILITY OF FAMILY 
POLICY 193-215 (1981). 
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social reform has proved unsuccessful, 138 and a sense that social sci-
ence lacks the predictive and analytic power to reverse that failure. 139 
In sum, the traditional difficulties of enforcing family law persist. 
The sense that they persist has increased. And fresh doubts are now 
expressed that even large-scale governmental action can accomplish 
family law's ends. The tradition of nonintervention in family affairs 
thus continues to deter family law from addressing moral problems 
whose resolution it cannot enforce. 
B. The Tradition of Liberal Individualism 
'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence gone; 
All just supply, and all Relation: 
Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot, 
For every man alone thinkes he hath got 
To be a Phoenix, and that then can bee 
None of that kinde, of which he is, but hee. 
-John Donne 
An Anatomy of the World: 
The First Anniversary (1633) 
The legal tradition of noninterference in the family is in large part 
based, as we have seen, on practical difficulties encountered in trying 
to enforce family law. That tradition has been reinforced by an ideo-
logical development - the increasing displacement of the old republi-
can ideal and the elevation to legal orthodoxy of that dictum from 
Mill's On Liberty that asserts 
that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or col-
lectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, 
is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be right-
fully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others.140 
Family-law thinking has, in places, incorporated this moral preference 
against social intervention in personal affairs that do not do "harm to 
others."141 That moral preference has, for instance, underlain reforms 
of divorce law, of laws regulating sexual activities between consenting 
adults, and of laws regulating reproductive matters; indeed, it has 
probably informed legal attitudes about every aspect of the relation-
ship between the family and the state. 
138. See, e.g., C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984). 
139. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY 
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 25 (1981); Wald, supra note 132, passim. 
140. J. S. MILL, On Liberty, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 197 (M. Cohen ed. 
1961). Cf. B. SEMMEL, JOHN STUART MILL AND THE PURSUIT OF VIRTUE (1984). 
141. Comment, Limiting the State's Police Power: Judicial Reaction to John Stuart Mill, 37 
U. CHI. L. REV. 605 (1970). 
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However, Mill's principle applies uneasily to much of family law, 
for one of the traditional difficulties with that principle - the uncer-
tain meaning of "harm to others" - is particularly acute in family 
law, which, by definition, deals with one person's relationship with 
another person and therefore with a situation in which harm is always 
possible. And, because of the ties of affection (and finance) that bind 
family members, they are peculiarly vulnerable to each other: One 
spouse's suit for divorce will harm the other spouse, to say nothing of 
the distress caused their children142 and the penury inevitable when 
the divorcing spouses cannot support two households. (Precisely this 
vulnerability has, for instance, slowed the law's acceptance of marital 
contracts.) Not only are there many opportunities within families to 
harm other members; there are many incentives. The very people to 
whom the law transfers moral decisions will be "interested parties" -
that is why they have been accorded the power to make the decision 
- and will often have a psychological or even financial interest in a 
decision adverse to the interests of other family members. That the 
law has been so greatly influenced by Mill's principle in the face of 
these difficulties is testimony to the power that principle has acquired 
in family law. 
One explanation of the law's fondness for Mill, and a related cause 
of the trend toward diminished moral discourse in family law, is the 
law's increasingly pluralistic view of American society. Pluralism has 
strengthened the trend by inhibiting society's impulse to impose its 
moral principles on discrete groups within society and by nurturing a 
relativistic view of moral principles. 143 
Although pluralism seems to us self-evident among American vir-
tues and implicit in the first amendment, especially in the religion 
clauses, that amendment did not acquire its modem meaning until 
well into the twentieth century, long after the country's plural compo-
sition had become clear. But the burgeoning political and social 
power of ethnic groups, the admonitory example of Nazi Germany, 
the war against poverty, the civil rights movement, and the interna-
tional passion for regional, ethnic, religious, and national particular-
142. See, e.g., J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLEY, SURVIVING TifE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN 
AND PARENTS COPE WITif DIVORCE (1980). 
143. As Professor Allen writes, 
Contemporary efforts, often strongly resisted, to decriminalize offenses involving private 
sexual behavior, the uses of alcohol and other drugs, gambling, and the like, reflect not a 
search for consensus so much as a recognition of its absence. One of the arresting aspects of 
the current abortion controversy is its demonstration of the extraordinary divisions in 
American society on what it means to be a criminal. 
F. ALLEN, supra note 139, at 29 (footnote omitted). For a brief discussion of family law and 
pluralism, see C. Schneider, supra note 48. 
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ism, 144 among other causes, have made us self-conscious, if cautious, 
pluralists, as is evidenced by the impossibility of reading many late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century family-law opinions without 
embarrassment.145 And one way to accommodate diverse views about 
family morals has been to avoid resolving family law issues in terms of 
morals. 
In principle, the need to accommodate diverse views about the 
family is diminished by the fact that responsibility for family law is 
confided to the states: any state is socially less plural than the country 
as a whole and consequently should be better able to adjust family 
laws to fit the preferences of its citizens. In practice, however, family 
law is increasingly subject to national influence. States may, if they 
choose, reject that influence when it is exerted by scholars or by 
groups like the American Law Institute and the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Supreme Court's con-
tributions to family law, however, are more than precatory, and more 
than few. The Court's discovery in the fourteenth amendment of the 
"privacy" doctrine - which, in the Court's open-armed terms, has 
"some extension to activities relating to marriage, . . . procreation, 
... contraception, ... and child rearing and education"146 - has 
raised constitutional doubts in virtually every area of family law.147 
With that substantive due process provision always in the background, 
the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of procedural due process and 
its equal protection clause have further helped nationalize family 
law. 148 Finally, as the federal government furnishes more social serv-
144. There are nationalist movements, for example, among the Welsh, Scots, Irish, Basques, 
Corsicans, Ocs, and Quebecois, to name just a few, and it is said that there are "80,000 French-
speaking Swiss of the Jura Mountains who want to be detached from the German speaking 
canton of Berne and form one of their own .... " N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1975, at A20, col. 3, 
quoted in R. NELSON, ZoNING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 44 (1977). 
145. See, for example, Justice Douglas' opinion in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 
18-19 (1946), in which he quotes Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), to the effect 
that " 'Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, 
and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of Asiatic 
and of African people,' " and Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890), to the effect that" 'The organization of a community for the 
spread and practice of polygamy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary to the 
spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western 
world.'" 
146. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). 
147. See Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
1156 (1980). 
148. As to procedural due process, see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 
(S.D. Iowa 1975), ajfd., 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976). As to equal protection, see, e.g., Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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ices and continues to be the most convenient means for interest groups 
to reach their ends, we may expect to see more congressional and ad-
ministrative participation in family law. Thus the Department of 
Health and Human Services has conditioned receipt of federal funds 
on compliance with its "Baby Doe" regulations, 149 the House of Rep-
resentatives recently passed its first "sense of Congress" legislation 
dealing with a family-law issue (visitation rights for grandparents), 150 
and the President recently signed legislation making federal funds to 
states contingent on a state's using wage assignments to collect child-
support payments even where the custodial parent receives no federal 
funds.1s1 
The nationalization of family law thus conduces to the trend to-
ward less moral discourse in the law by increasing the number of 
groups whose moral preferences must be accommodated. Finally, it 
probably also promotes the trend by accentuating the influence of the 
relatively elite individuals and institutions who, I have hypothe-
sized, 152 are especially likely to favor the changes that have led to di-
minished moral discourse, to whom liberal individualism seems 
natural. 
C. Society's Changing Moral Beliefs 
Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's 
aggressive instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check by 
psychical reaction-formations. Hence, therefore, the use of methods in-
tended to incite people into identifications and aim-inhibited relation-
ships of love, hence the restriction upon sexual life, and hence too the 
ideal's commandment to love one's neighbour as oneself - a command-
149. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 app. C (1984). This regulation is an irresistible example of the grad-
ual nationalization of family law, but it hardly exemplifies the trend toward diminished moral 
discourse. It is, I suggest, rather an example of the rightist, fundamentalist reaction to that 
trend, see Part V. infra, and it has correspondingly provoked much displeasure. See, e.g., United 
States v. University Hosp., State U. ofN.Y. at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1984); 
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.D.C. 1983). See generally 
Mnookin, supra note 48; C. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia (unpublished 
manuscript). 
150. See H. Con. Res. 45, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The Senate equivalent, S. Con. Res. 
40, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), was approved on Feb. 23, 1984, by the Separation of Powers 
Subcommittee for full committee consideration. However, the bill was never acted upon by the 
full committee and has not been reintroduced in the 99th Congress. 1 1983-84 CONG, INDEX 
(CCH) 20,552 (1984). 
151. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 1984 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & Ao. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1305. 
152. See Part II. B. supra. 
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ment which is really justified by the fact that nothing else runs so 
strongly counter to the original nature of man. 
- Sigmund Freud 
Civilization and 
its Discontents (1930) 
Liberal individualism, I have suggested, has increased our national 
tolerance for heterodox moralities, and has diminished the urge to im-
pose morality profligately. Yet those changes might have altered fam-
ily law less had not the old family law morality itself lost much of its 
meaning. As Mill wrote in a related context, 
so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, 
that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, ex-
cept where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace dis-
turbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. 153 
To put it schematically, less is immoral; moral discourse in the law 
occurs most readily ( especially in a law reluctant to be aspirational) 
when there is something to condemn; because there is less to condemn, 
there is less moral discourse. 
"The sexual revolution" has become the name for that change in 
moral attitudes toward family and sexual life that has been developing 
at least since the end of the nineteenth century, when the " 'new mo-
rality' . . . proclaimed the joys of the body, defended divorce and 
birth control, raised doubts about monogamy, and condemned inter-
ference with sexual life by the state or community."154 The revolution 
changed attitudes about every area of sexual morality quite as spectac-
ularly as it changed rates of nonmarital sexual activity and of divorce. 
Professor Shorter reports, for instance, that "the percent of Americans 
who believe 'it is wrong for people to have sex relations before mar-
riage' fell from 68 percent in 1969 to 48 percent in 1973 .... " 155 So 
great has the revolution's influence been that, even when it has not 
changed a person's behavior or his standards for himself, it has com-
monly softened his standards for other people.156 
One cause of the sexual revolution has been the waning influence 
of Christianity among the relatively affluent, educated elite.157 There 
153. J. S. MILL, supra note 140, at 195. 
154. C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED 10 (1977). 
155. E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY 114 (1975). 
156. See, e.g., T. CAPLOW, H. BAHR, B. CHADWICK, R. HILL.& M. WILLIAMSON, MID-
DLETOWN FAMILIES 54 (1982). 
157. See Shriver, Neighbors on the Religious Landscape: Churches and Church Membership 
in the United States, 1980, 1983 Y.B. AM. & CANADIAN CHURCHES 264, 266 (reporting a decline 
in membership in "liberal" churches); and McKinney & Roof, A Social Profile of American Reli-
gious Groups, 1982 Y.B. AM. & CANADIAN CHURCHES 267, 269 (showing a statistical correla-
tion between membership in "liberal" churches and high levels of income and education). 
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are, surely, many believers left among this group. But many of them 
believe in a liberal Christianity whose moral views on family law mat-
ters have long parted from those of traditional Christianity and of con-
servative churches. 158 And even Catholics and conservative 
Protestants now give sexual relations - albeit only within marriage -
that same unctuous importance given them by psychologized 
nonbelievers. 159 
These changes in religious beliefs deeply undercut traditional fam-
ily law, for much of it comes from the law of the English ecclesiastical 
courts and rests on classic Christian attitudes toward sexual matters. 
About those attitudes, Professor Rieff writes, "renunciatory controls 
of sexual opportunity were placed in the Christian culture very near 
the center of the symbolic that has not held."160 Quoting von 
Harnack, Rieff continues, 
At bottom, only a single point was dealt with, abstinence from sexual 
relationships; everything else was secondary: for he who had renounced 
these found nothing hard. Renunciation of the servile yoke of sin (servile 
peccati iugum discutere) was the watchword of Christians .... Virgin-
ity was the specifically Christian virtue, and the essence of all virtues; in 
this conviction the meaning of the evangelical law was summed up. 161 
Such beliefs are now rejected or even unrecognized by many Chris-
tians, 162 and the altered social role of American Christianity has 
158. HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 5, at 62-65, 219-49. Christianity's influence on 
American family law deserves much more thorough treatment than is possible here. That influ-
ence has necessarily been great, since the U.S. is a more religious country than any of its Western 
counterparts. Id. at 219; T. CAPLOW, H. BAHR, B. CHADWICK, D. HOOVl!R, L. MARTIN, J. 
TAMNEY & M. WILLIAMSON, ALL FAITHFUL PEOPLE: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN MID-
DLETOWN'S RELIGION 26-27 (1983). In the Progressive era, for instance, much of the debate 
over divorce rates and divorce reform was carried on among spokesmen for the various branches 
of Christianity. w. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1967). And in a country 
whose religious forms are so much more varied than those of its Western counterparts, that 
influence has been necessarily complex. Consider, for instance, this sample of American Chris-
tian thought on the nature of marriage: Mormons once practiced polygamy (some still do, as 
demonstrated by In re Black, 3 Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 887, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 923 (1955)); 
liberal Protestants see benefits in serial monogamy, conservative Protestants countenance it, Ro-
man Catholics do not; some liberal Protestants would permit homosexuals to marry, some con-
servative Christians would prefer to see them bum; some Christians believe marriage the only 
proper locus of sexual relations, many do not; and the Shakers practiced celibacy, while Christian 
Scientists look forward hopefully to the day when sexual relations will be unnecessary for 
reproduction. 
159. See P. GARDELLA, INNOCENT EcsTASY: How CHRISTIANITY GAVE AMERICA AN 
ETHIC OF SEXUAL PLEASURE (1985). 
160. P. RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FAITH AFrER FREUD 16 
(1966). 
161. Id. at 16-17, quoting A. VON HARNACK, 3 HISTORY OF DOGMA 128 (English transla-
tion 1894-99). 
162. "Current apologetic efforts by religious professionals, in pretending that renunciation as 
the general mode of control was never dominant in the system, reflect the strange mixture of 
cowardice and courage with which they are participating in the dissolution of their cultural 
functions." P. RIEFF, supra note 160, at 16. 
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made them virtually incomprehensible to many Americans. 
In other words, because religious views are less universally and 
strongly held, 163 statements of moral aspiration linked to religion have 
slipped more readily from legal discourse. This change is visible, for 
example, in the child-custody area, where evidence of concern for the 
moral welfare of the child - as instanced, for example, by evidence 
that the parent sends the child to Sunday school - is increasingly 
thought irrelevant. Because religious views on marital obligations 
have changed, the move to no-fault divorce was eased, and perhaps 
even made more necessary. Similarly, because religious views on sex-
ual relations outside of marriage have changed, the law's tolerance, 
and even encouragement, of such relations has increased, as Marvin et 
al. indicate. Abortion, neonatal euthanasia, and homosexuality are 
but a few more examples of areas in which the changing nature and 
weight of religious views have helped change legal views and language. 
D. The Rise of Psychologic Man 
1. The Social Change 
If man were independent, he could have no law but his own will, no end 
but himself. He would be a god to himself and the satisfaction of his 
own will the sole measure and end of all his actions. 
-John Locke 
Ethica (1693) 
When so little can be taken for granted, and when the meaningfulness of 
social existence no longer grants an inner life at peace with itself, every 
man must become something of a genius about himself. But the imagi-
nation boggles at a culture made up mainly of virtuosi of the self. 
- Philip Rieff 
The Triumph of the 
Therapeutic (1966) 
Sexual mores are not the only part of the old "family morality" to 
have lost their meaning; there has also been a larger shift from a 
"moral" to a "psychological" view of personal affairs. This shift is, of 
course, a cause (and probably also a consequence) of our changing 
view of sexual morals, it has sharpened our appreciation of the en-
forcement problem, and it shapes and is shaped by the tradition of 
liberal individualism. This shift may not be the most crucial cause of 
the trend away from moral discourse in family law; indeed, it is point-
163. See note 157 supra. The recently emerged fundamentalist movement represents a 
counterexample to the general decline in currency of religious views. For a discussion of the 
limits of this counterexample, see notes 262-75 infra and accompanying text. 
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less to attempt such a distinction at this stage of our knowledge. How-
ever, the psychologic view merits particular attention here for several 
reasons. First, while psychology has, of all the social sciences, contrib-
uted most abundantly to family law scholarship, the consequences for 
family law of the psychologic view have not been sufficiently analyzed. 
Second, the rise of the psychologic view provokes specially intriguing 
questions about how ideas from "high" and "popular" culture enter 
legal thought and about the interplay between modes of popular and 
of legal thinking. Third, and perhaps most important, because the 
psychologic view interacts in important ways with each of the other 
origins of the trend, and because the psychologic view so directly af-
fects the terms of modem discourse, a detailed study of its conse-
quences for the law is an apt way to elaborate a description of the new 
discourse in family law. I shall therefore devote disproportionate 
space to it. 
a. The complexities of the shift. The shift to psychologism has, of 
course, been described before, usually in apocalyptic woe or messianic 
joy. Nevertheless, the shift confounds description because it is intel-
lectually fragmented and complex. Its patriarch and paradigm, surely, 
is Freud. But no important thought achieves social power un-
degraded, and Freud's thought has reached its present power in a 
gaudy array of vulgarizations which have, in the public mind, over-
whelmed the sophisticated variants. 
The shift further confounds description because it is also sociologi-
cally complex.164 Nevertheless, its scope and significance cannot be 
doubted. 165 Thus three leading students of the shift announce "the 
164. One difficulty with using social generalizations in scholarship is that they are read in 
light of the social caricatures of journalism. Psychologic man shares characteristics of the mem• 
ber of the "me generation," but I resist any equation of the two. The caricature of the "me 
generation" has many inaccuracies: it hides the reasons for the popularity of the psychologic 
view, it conceals the virtues of that view, it exaggerates the selfishness of modern human beings, 
and so on. The caricature also hides the extent to which human opinions are shaped by the 
words and ideas that are available in a culture. As the authors of HABITS OF THE HEART, supra 
note 5, argue, the acts of modern Americans are often much less selfish than their attitudes, a 
discrepancy that can be understood partly in terms of the failure of modern culture to provide 
the language with which to articulate moral aspirations. See particularly id. at 290-94. 
165. Psychologic man, as I have suggested, appears in many guises. He is well - or provoc-
atively - described in HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 5; c. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF 
NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM]; C. LASCH, THE MINIMAL SELF: PSYCHIC SURVIVAL 
IN TROUBLED TIMES (1984); P. RIEFF, FREUD: THE MIND OF THE MORALIST (1959); P. 
RIEFF, supra note 160. Among the better empirical investigations is the study of changes in 
American attitudes from 1957 to 1976 in J. VEROFF, supra note 24. This study uses a survey of 
2460 "normal adults" made in 1957 as part of a congressional study of "national resources for 
coping with the human and economic problems of mental illness." Id. at 2. It compares that 
survey with a somewhat more elaborate study of 2267 "normal adults" in 1976. 
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introduction of the 'era of psychology.' " 166 A 1957 study on which 
those scholars rely "spoke of a psychological orientation, as distin-
guished from material or moral orientations, and suggested that this 
way of looking at life experiences and life problems might increase 
significantly in the future.'' 167 By 1976, they conclude, "this shift had 
indeed occurred." 
b. From morals to medicine: the role of human happiness. For 
our purposes, a central feature of the psychologic view is that it re-
places moral discourse with medical discourse and moral thought with 
therapeutic thought. That shift may usefully be understood in terms 
of the role attributed to human happiness in social life. The old view 
held that men and women were obligated to lead a good life as that 
was defined by religious or social convention. Happiness was not the 
purpose of these conventions, but was expected to be a by-product of 
performing one's duties. If it did not come, however, one would be 
consoled by knowing one had led the right kind of life. The psycho-
logic view, at least in its ideal type, denies that there are religious or 
social conventions that are independently valid. It holds that life's 
goal is the search for personal well-being, adjustment, and content-
ment - in short, for "health.''168 Adherence to a religious or social 
convention may serve that end, but if it does not, other paths to well-
being should be tried and used. 169 In short, says Rieff mordantly, 
[E]vil and immorality are disappearing, as Spencer assumed they would, 
mainly because our culture is changing its definition of human perfec-
tion. No longer the Saint, but the instinctual Everyman, twisting his 
neck uncomfortably inside the starched collar of culture, is the commu-
nal ideal, to whom men offer tacit prayers for deliverance from their 
inherited renuciations. 170 
On the old view, the right life was difficult: one's duties were nu-
merous and onerous (though not necessarily unpleasant); distractions 
from duty were numerous and dangerous. Thus codes of family mo-
rality were aspirational and ascetic. As Professor Rieff observes: 
Heretofore, the saving arrangements of W estem culture have ap-
peared as symbol systems communicating demands by stoning the sen-
sual with deprivations, and were thus operated in a dynamically 
166. J. VEROFF, supra note 24, at 24. 
161. Id. at 24-25. 
168. The World Health Organization, for instance, defines health as "a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." M. 
MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 119 (1984). 
169. "Our cultural revolution does not aim, like its predecessors, at victory for some rival 
commitment, but rather at a way of using all commitments, which amounts to loyalty toward 
none." P. RIEFF, supra note 160, at 21. 
170. Id. at 8. Rieff continues, "Freud sought only to soften the collar; others, using bits and 
pieces of his genius, would like to take it off." 
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ambivalent mode. Our culture developed, as its general technique of sal-
vation, assents to moral demands that treated the sensual part of the self 
as an enemy. From mastery over this enemy-self there developed some 
triumphant moral feeling; a character ideal was born. 171 
The psychologic view concedes that "stoning the sensual with depriva-
tions" can work, but doubts it will. That view sees the drive of the 
instincts as crucial to understanding human motivation, believes that 
confining the drive of the instincts tends to be unhealthy,172 and, more 
specifically, sees sexual expression as central to human happiness. 
c. Antinomianism, pragmatism, and nonbinding commitments. 
In his search for health, psychologic man must be skeptical and ana-
lytic in method and pragmatic in evaluation. In particular, psycholog-
ical man must learn not to judge himself, his relationships, or other 
people according to moral rules; to do so is dysfunctional, since it asks 
the wrong question ("Is it right?") and blinds him to the answers to 
the right question ("Does it work?"). 173 In other words, psychological 
man cannot come to rest in any relationship, or any community, or 
any creed; he must keep asking whether they are working for him.174 
This is the doctrine of "nonbinding commitments."175 Personal and 
familial relations, on this view, become "arrangement[s] of conven-
ience designed to advance the personal satisfactions and self-fulfill-
171. Id. at 49. The problem of the "ascetic ideal" in American family law, to which I re-
ferred in Part II. B. supra, deserves much closer attention than this already lengthy article per-
mits. The subject's complexity makes any brief description of it incorrect, and ill-informed 
preconceptions about the subject make any brief description of it certain to be misread. The 
Puritans were less puritanical, the Victorians less Victorian, than those adjectives imply. But 
changing attitudes toward pleasure generally and sexual expression particularly have directly 
influenced areas of family law as diverse as incest restrictions, sodomy statutes, divorce, alimony, 
child custody, and abortion, and have probably influenced many other areas indirectly. 
172. See, e.g., S. FREUD, "Civilized'' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness, in SEXUAL· 
ITY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LoVE 20 (P. Rieff ed. 1963). But cf. s. FREUD, CtVILIZATION 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1930). 
173. Insofar as psychological man validates his normative views by reference to something 
besides his own health, he does so sociologically. As Lionel Trilling wrote of the Kinsey Report, 
it accumulates facts with the intention of showing that standards of judgment of sexual 
conduct as they now exist do not have real reference to the actual sexual behavior of the 
population. So far, so good. But then it goes on to imply that there can be only one stan-
dard for the judgment of sexual behavior - that is, sexual behavior as it actually exists; 
which is to say that sexual behavior is not to be judged at all, except, presumably, in so far as 
it causes pain to others. 
L. TRILLING, The Kinsey Report, in THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION 216, 235 (1953). 
174. Psychologic man: 
takes on the attitude of a scientist, with himself alone as the ultimate object of his sci-
ence .... [I]deally, all options ought to be kept alive because, theoretically, all are equally 
advisable - or inadvisable, in given personal circumstances. 
. . . A high level of control is necessary in order to shift from one perspective to an-
other, so to soften the demands upon oneself in all the major situations of life - love, 
parenthood, friendship, work, and citizenship. 
P. RIEFF, supra note 160, at 50-51. 
175. This ravishing phrase is from Nena and George O'Neill, quoted in THE CULTURE OF 
NARCISSISM, supra note 165, at 200. 
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ment of [their] members."176 
d. The search for self and the psychologic view of human nature. 
In the psychologic view, happiness comes from discovering and ex-
pressing one's unique true self. That self is discovered by peeling off 
society's false impositions and is expressed by peeling off its false con-
straints. Among the false impositions and constraints to be peeled off 
in the search for the "more personalized self-consciousness" are the 
roles and statuses into which society places people. Thus Vero:ff, 
Douvan, and Kulka announce as one of their "central themes" that 
"[s]ocial organization, social norms, the adaptation to and successful 
performance of social roles all seem to have lost some of their power to 
provide people with meaning, identity elements, satisfaction. In fact, 
role and status designations have become objects of sus-
picion. . . . " 177 
The psychologic attitude seems to imply an optimistic account of 
human nature; if its proponents thought people base and vile, they 
could hardly advocate a Hobbesian world without the Leviathan or be 
so cheery about man's quest to find and express himself. Much psy-
chologic writing explicitly argues that human nature is benign enough 
that, freed of socially imposed constraints, men will behave better than 
they do now. This benignity is buoyed by faith in human malleability: 
If people behave badly, it is because of environmental factors, which 
can be manipulated, or because of patterns of thought and behavior, 
which can (on some therapeutic views) be changed even if they cannot 
be understood. 
Yet psychologic man's view of human nature is profoundly ambiv-
176. F. ALLEN, supra note 139, at 22. See HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 5, at 97-100. 
Similarly, "All binding engagements to communal purpose may be considered, in the wisdom of 
therapeutic doctrines, too extreme .••• " P. RIEFF, supra note 160, at 242. 
Veroff, Douvan, and Kulka confirm that there is progress toward these attitudes. Thus the 
well educated are more likely than the uneducated to see their marriages as "the coexistence of 
two separate people rather than as the bond of a couple," J. VEROFF, supra note 24, at 188, 
people in general and the young in particular are more skeptical about marriage, which they 
increasingly find burdensome and restrictive, id. at 147-48, 182, and marriage terminable replaces 
marriage interminable. And although people are unhappier now than twenty years ago about 
"interpersonal aspects of marriage," id. at 164, they take slightly greater pleasure than they used 
to in being independent and in their own characteristics as sources of happiness. Id. at 58-59. 
Finally, there is a "shift from moral-virtuous terms in 1957 to personality terms in 1976 [which] 
seems a clear shift from normative concepts of morality to more individuated and morally neu-
tral bases of self-conception." Id. at 118. As Veroff, Douvan, and Kulka note, "Structuring 
personal strengths in normative moral categories means the ever-present possibility of failure to 
meet the norm and the consequent negative self-evaluation, while the more neutral personality 
categories imply an aesthetic distance and an appreciation of self." Id. at 120. Thus the incestu-
ous gentleman described in note 181 infra said that he had learned from therapy that what he 
had done was natural and not wrong, but was dysfunctional (i.e., his daughter was mad at him, 
his wife divorced him, and the police arrested him) and therefore to be avoided. 
177. Id. at 17. 
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alent. Against the optimism described in the preceding paragraph are 
pitted a vivid sense of the power and ubiquity of the passions, a dark 
sense of their cruelty, and a resigned sense that character is irrevoca-
bly and inevitably formed by early and universal experiences.178 Psy-
chologic man's strain of pessimism about individual human nature is 
matched by a strain of pessimism about the capacity of systematic so-
cial activity to enhance human happiness. Professor Allen, in explain-
ing why psychologism has been inimical to penal rehabilitation, notes 
the movement's frequent anti-intellectualism, its absence of public 
purpose, and the perverse fact that it "has not generally nourished the 
autonomy of individuals but has expressed a weariness with self-
hood. "179 Even "contemporary expressions of confidence in human 
malleability are often accompanied by a pervasive pessimism about the 
effectiveness and integrity of social institutions."180 
e. The psychologic view of privacy. Psychologic man's ambiva-
lence about human nature extends to his views about privacy. On one 
hand, searching for one's self and peeling off social constraints seem to 
require privacy, and "privacy" at least as a slogan has more social 
(and legal) cachet than it used to. But those most enthralled by the 
psychologic attitude seem the least interested in privacy, as we may 
infer from the phrase "let it all hang out," from the techniques of psy-
chotherapy, from the ,proclivity to use those techniques in ordinary 
conversation, from the itch of celebrities to discuss the intimacies of 
their lives on television, from the eagerness of the rest of us to become 
celebrities by retailing and living the intimacies of our lives on televi-
sion, 181 from our willingness to tell survey researchers whatever they 
want to know, from the belief in first names at first sight, and from the 
compelled contemplation of intimate and ultimate questions imposed 
on us by the pictures of the dead, the dying, and the dishabille which 
accost us in the daily papers and the monthly magazines. And some 
sacrifice of privacy seems inherent in the free expression of one's true 
personality, in the desire to reduce the power of social roles, and in the 
178. The locus classicus of this view is s. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
(1930). See also J. DEESE, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND TIIE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1985). However, 
the more popular versions of psychologism are less dark. 
179. F. ALLEN, supra note 139, at 26-28. 
180. Id. at 19. 
181. I will confine my examples to a chaste few and to the area of family law. I once saw a 
Phil Donahue show in which a mother (voluntarily) met, for the first time, the daughter she had 
given up for adoption at birth. I once heard a National Public Radio "All Things Considered" 
program in which a man who had committed incest with his young daughter was, with his family 
interviewed at length about their experiences. I am told that, in the case of a man who had hired 
a surrogate mother and who, when the baby arrived with birth defects, claimed that the baby was 
not his, all the parties involved went on television to receive the results of the paternity test. To 
say nothing of the Louds, who came onto television to come apart. 
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instant intimacy with family, friends, and colleagues that is also part 
of the psychologic creed.182 
The apparent conflict in psychologic man's view of privacy may 
perhaps be resolved, however, if we recall that privacy has come to 
have two meanings. The first, conventional, meaning speaks to the 
secrecy in which one conducts one's affairs. The second, newer, mean-
ing speaks directly to the ability to conduct one's affairs autono-
mously. It is privacy in the second meaning psychological man wants, 
for without autonomy his efforts to find and express himself may be 
thwarted. And it is privacy in the first meaning that psychological 
man does not need, for, to him, secrecy is desired by those who are 
ashamed of what they do, and psychologic man's moral relativism and 
his awareness that all men serve unconscious drives make shame 
shameful. Honi soit qui ma/ y pense. 
f. A case study. Perhaps greater concreteness can be given to psy-
chologic man by reporting one version of his rise. Professor Susman 
suggests that in the nineteenth century, "character" was the word 
most revelatory of the modal American type, but that in the twentieth 
century, that word was "personality." The nineteenth century held 
"that the highest development of self ended in a version of self-control 
or self-mastery, which often meant fulfillment through sacrifice in the 
name of a higher law, ideals of duty, honor, integrity. One came to 
selfhood through obedience to law and ideals."183 The words "most 
frequently related to the notion of character" were "citizenship, duty, 
democracy, work, building, golden deeds, outdoor life, conquest, honor, 
reputation, morals, manners, integrity, and above all, manhood."184 
The twentieth century, on the other hand, "stressed self-fulfillment, 
self-expression, self-gratification .... " Its "essentially antinomian 
. . . vision . . . with its view not of a higher law but of a higher self, 
was tempered by the suggestion that the self ought to be presented to 
society in such a way as to make oneself 'well-liked.' " 185 The adjec-
tives most frequently associated with personality "suggest a very dif-
ferent concept from that of character: fascinating, stunning, attractive, 
magnetic, glowing, masterful, creative, dominant, forceful. " 186 
182. J. VEROFF, supra note 24, at 20. 
183. Susman, "Personality" and the Making of Twentieth-Century Culture, in NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HlsrORY 212, 220 (J. Higham & P. Conkin eds. 1979). 
184. Id. at 214 (emphasis in original). 
185. Id. at 220. 
186. Id. at 214 (emphasis in original). 
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2. The Legal Consequences of the Rise of Psychologic Man 
The wisdom of the next social order, as I imagine it, would not reside in 
right doctrine, administered by the right men, who must be found, but 
rather in doctrines amounting to permission for each man to live an ex-
perimental life. . . . All governments will be just, so long as they secure 
that consoling plenitude of option in which modern satisfaction really 
consists. In this way the emergent culture could drive the value problem 
clean out of the social system and, limiting it to a form of philosophical 
entertainment in lieu of edifying preachment, could successfully con-
clude the exercise for which politics is the name. 
- Philip Rieff 
The Triumph of the Therapeutic (1966) 
The legal consequences of a new character ideal are, inevitably, 
tangled and obscure, especially where that ideal is variously shaped 
and varyingly accepted. Nevertheless, the psychologic character ideal 
is now so well-established that its influence on the law is inescapable. 
That influence is exerted in two ways: first, lawmakers respond to 
changes in the behavior and beliefs of the people they seek to regulate. 
Second, the new ideal alters the language, assumptions, and acts of the 
lawmakers themselves. The legal effect of the psychologic view can 
thus be substantial. But my argument in this Part will be modest -
not that the rise of psychologic man has, of its own force, created 
wholly new doctrine, but rather that it has, in concert with the other 
social forces I have described, shaped the ways we use doctrines and 
ideas already present in the law. 
a. From morals to medicine. In the preceding section, I identi-
fied, to borrow Professor Boorse's words, "a strong tendency . . . to 
debate social issues in psychiatric terms. . . . This growing prefer-
ence for medicine over morals . . . might be called the psychiatric 
turn."187 Of course, that "tum" itself constitutes a change in dis-
course, because it directly substitutes one kind of discourse for an-
other. Consider, for instance, situations in which family law looks at 
the whole of someone's personality, as when it evaluates the suitability 
of a guardian or the best interests of a child. The psychologic ap-
proach looks to that person's "health," mental and physical, 188 while 
the old view holds that the guardian's qualifications and the child's 
interests include (prominently) the state of his mind and his morals. 
The medical view also discards the old view that there is such a 
thing as "moral character" and that it should be considered in, for 
instance, child-custody decisions. The idea of "moral character" as-
187. Boorse, On the Distinction Between Disease and Illness, in MEDICINE AND MORAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 3 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1981) (emphasis in original). 
188. E.g., UN!F. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402(5), 9A U.L.A. 197-98 (1973). 
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sum.es that moral qualities are relevant to every aspect of one's person-
ality, and that one's moral nature is essentially unitary. The disuse of 
"moral character," then, marks a shift away from a broad, if not 
global, way of looking at personality. Thus the Michigan legislature 
once believed it had said enough when it authorized courts to commit 
neglected children to the care of "some reputable citizen of good 
moral character."189 And thus to be of bad moral character was, 
under the old view, almost to·be barred from winning custody of a 
child. In the law's new view, however, moral character becomes, at 
best, one trait among many. At worst, the idea of moral character 
vanishes altogether, to be replaced by the view that a person's moral 
qualities are unrelated to each other. For instance, modem family law 
holds that even if you have erred morally the law cannot infer that you 
are likely to commit the same fault again, or that you are likely to 
commit other faults. 190 The eclipse of "moral character'' thus dimin-
ishes the quantum of moral discourse by depreciating the contribution 
of a person's moral nature to his entire personality and by removing 
from the law a useful (whether or not accurate) predictive theory. 
Also implicit in the idea of "moral character" are the beliefs that 
one's moral nature is within one's own control, and that it is helpful to 
talk about one's conduct in moral terms. Psychologic man and, in-
creasingly, the law doubt both of these beliefs. "No-fault" divorce, for 
instance, captures neatly the psychologic attitude toward the latter be-
lief: There ought be no sense of guilt when a marriage doesn't work, 
because there was simply a technical dysfunction; there ought to be no 
sense of prolonged responsibility, because that would itself be dysfunc-
tional; and there ought to be no regulation of those technical problems 
except, possibly, a technical one, i.e., counselling.191 
189. 1907 Mich. Pub. Acts 325. 
190. See, e.g., Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983); Gratrix v. Gratrix, 652 P.2d 76 
(Alaska 1982). 
191. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.081 (West 1981) (requiring counseling in actions for 
divorce or legal separation). Cf. J. VEROFF, supra note 24, at 542-43 (emphasis in original): 
Although there is a large increase in perceived problems in marriage, there is no comparable 
increase in [perceived] inadequacies in performing the marital role. We can only suggest 
that the interpersonal orientation that has become so dominant a theme in American life has 
for some reason reduced the personal sense of responsibility people have in performing these 
roles. . . . Could it be that the new vision of marital role difficulties as a system of interper-
sonal communication problems rather than ones in which one spouse or the other is at fault, 
reduces guilt that men and women feel about marital difficulties? . . . As it becomes more 
normative to think about interpersonal difficulties in both marriage and parenthood, per-
haps difficulties can be thought of as system problems, rather than personal flaws. 
There may be a legal analogy to the sociological view of morals to which psychologic man 
subscribes in the judicial tendency to justify legal change by referring to the extent of change in 
family life. See, e.g., the opening sentence of Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 
134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) ("During the past 15 years, there has been a substantial increase in the 
number of couples living together without marrying"); and Dosek v. Dosek, 8 FAM. L. REP. 
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The law's tum from morals to medicine is further evidenced by the 
difficulty the law has with the view - implicit in the the "moral char-
acter" idea - that moral conduct is within one's control. The medical 
viewpoint poses two (related) challenges to that belief: first, that some 
moral faults are illnesses, and therefore beyond one's responsibility; 
and second, that all behavior is determined by forces beyond one's 
control. The law, obviously, cannot fully accede to the second chal-
lenge, but family law, at least, has been influenced by both. This influ-
ence can be seen even in an area as instinct with moral problems and 
feeling as child abuse, where the law has "accepted in principle the 
therapeutic approach."192 
The "psychiatric tum" diminishes moral discourse in family law in 
yet another way. The tendency to see family law problems in medical 
terms readily leads law to rely on specialists from other disciplines -
medicine, psychiatry, psychology, social work, and so on. As it relies 
on experts from these disciplines, the law adopts their language, 
thereby diminishing moral discourse. Further, the law to some extent 
confides direct power to such experts - to doctors admitting patients 
to state hospitals, 193 to social workers, to probation officers - and to 
some extent relies on their recommendations. To the extent the law 
does so, it replaces legal discourse (with its traditionally substantial 
quantum of moral discourse) with the discourse of another discipline. 
That substitution is noticeable, for example, in child-custody law, 
where a psychiatric recommendation can seem so encompassing, so 
authoritative, and so portentous that it overwhelms all other 
considerations. 
The celebrated case of Painter v. Bannister, 194 for instance, is usu-
ally taken as an example of Iowa stubbornness and invincible provin-
cialism. However, a careful reading reveals the central influence of the 
psychiatric testimony in the case. The court began by comparing the 
"philosophies" of Mark Painter's father and of his grandparents, con-
ceded its preference for the "stable, dependable, conventional, middle-
class, middlewest" home of the grandparents, and said "security and 
stability in the home are more important than intellectual stimulation 
in the proper development of a child," but then stated that a father has 
a special claim to custody of his child. However, instead of resolving 
(BNA) 2530 (1982 Conn. Super. Ct.) Gustifying a similar change in the law by saying that its 
holding was "but another example of the truth of Holmes' famous dictum that 'the life of the law 
has not been logic, it has been experience' "). 
192. Newberger & Bourne, The Medicalization and Legalization of Child Abuse, 48 AM. J. 
ORTH0PSYCHIATRY 593, 600 (1978). 
193. An especially significant example is Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
194. 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966). 
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this moral and legal conflict, the court devoted the final two pages of 
the opinion to extensive quotations from the psychologist who had tes-
tified that the grandparents were the psychological parents and that 
"the chances are very high (Mark) will go wrong if he is returned to 
his father." With testimony of this astonishing scope and assurance, 
the court apparently felt itself relieved of further inquiry into the 
moral, social, and legal problems it faced. 
b. Nonbinding commitments. A second consequence of the psy-
chological view for my theory arises from the doctrine of "nonbinding 
commitments." That doctrine, fully accepted, could eliminate many 
of the moral problems over which family law has puzzled, since many 
of them have to do with how binding commitments should be, with 
whether, when, and how one spouse may leave another or a parent 
may leave a child.195 The doctrine finds its legal analogues in the law's 
tendency to see families in terms of their individual members and not 
as units and in the legal tendency to make it easier to leave a family. 
Like the doctrine of nonbinding commitments, these legal tendencies 
are sustained by psychologic man's pragmatic view of personal rela-
tions - the view that a relationship should be maintained only if it 
"works," that "options" should be kept numerous and open to "facili-
tate personal growJ;h," and that living in a family is a matter of psy-
chological adjustment, a technical matter of finding happiness, not a 
matter of moral relations. This view prefers temporary marriages, 
temporary nonmarital arrangements, and temporary children, and the 
law is coming to accommodate it. 
No-fault divorce exemplifies that accommodation, along with the 
various procedural reforms designed to make divorce speedy and sim-
ple. And coordinate with this view of no-fault divorce are its compan-
ions, the trend toward permitting couples to contract in anticipation of 
divorce, the trend toward short-term "rehabilitative" alimony, and 
whatever trend there may be toward diminished responsibility for 
child support after divorce.196 The law has also accommodated itself 
to the view of "marital" relations as temporary by creating - and, not 
inconsiderably, legitimizing - temporary alternatives to marriage.197 
195. Or a child a parent. See In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975). 
196. See text at notes 20-29 supra. Note that, as to the last of these, there is much to suggest 
the larger trend is in the other direction. 
197. See text at notes 36-41 supra. Courts have not only countenanced nonmarital contracts 
(even, at least in principle, to the extent of finding them implied in fact or in Jaw), but they have 
also begun to allow such contracts to give rise to "alimony," e.g. Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 
(Alaska 1980), and begun to toy with the notion of creating an action for loss of consortium for 
cohabitors, e.g. Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D. N.J. 1980); Sutherland v. Auch 
Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 
Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). But see Hendrix v. General Motors 
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Finally, the dwindling of family-responsibility statutes198 reflects the 
temporary quality of family relations from a somewhat different angle. 
The law's increasing propensity to see the family in terms of its 
component members rather than as an entity is specially visible in, and 
in part arises from, the law's increasing propensity to see issues in 
terms of individual rights. The Court's shift from Griswold v. Connect-
icut199 to Eisenstadt v. Baird 200 (from its first modem "privacy" case 
to its second) catches those propensities near their origin. In Griswold 
(which held unconstitutional a statute criminalizing the use of contra-
ceptives), the Court's discovery of a "right to privacy" was expressly 
the discovery of a special right, one "older than the Bill of Rights -
older than our political parties, older than our school system," a right 
that grew out of the special relationship of marriage. The Court apos-
trophized marriage as "a coming together for better or for worse, 
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred." Al-
lowing police "to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" 
would be "repulsive."201 But in Eisenstadt, where contraceptives were 
distributed to the unmarried, the Court held that the Equal Protection 
Clause requires that the right of access to contraceptives "must be the 
same for the unmarried and the married alike." The Court conceded 
that "in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the mari-
tal relationship." However, the Court discarded Griswold's enco-
mium to marriage for something akin to its opposite: 
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart 
of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate 
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 202 
The law of abortion provides two further examples of situations in 
which the Supreme Court's "rights" perspective has encouraged it to 
regard the family as a collection of individuals. In Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 203 the Court held uncon-
stitutional a statute requiring a married woman seeking an abortion in 
the first twelve weeks of pregnancy to obtain her husband's consent, 
Corp., 193 Cal. Rptr. 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165 (Me. 1980); 
Childers v. Shannon, 183 N.J. Super. 591, 444 A.2d 1141 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982). 
198. See text at notes 30-31 supra. 
199. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
200. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
201. 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
202. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original). 
203. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
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unless the abortion was necessary to preserve her life. The state had 
justified the statute on the grounds of its "perception of marriage as an 
institution" and its view that "any major change in family status is a 
decision to be made jointly by the marriage partners."204 The Court 
quoted the passage from Eisenstadt that I just quoted, and reasoned 
that "since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the 
first stage, when the physician and his patient make that decision, the 
State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the 
spouse, to prevent abortion during that same period."205 However de-
sirable the Court's result may be, its reasoning is fragile. As Justice 
White noted in dissent, the state was not delegating a power, but 
rather "recognizing that the husband has an interest of his own in the 
life of the fetus. . . ."206 But even Justice White seemed not to credit 
that the state might be trying to impose, however unwisely, the view 
that the husband and wife ought to make the decision together. 
The second example from the abortion area is represented by Bel-
lotti v. Baird.207 The Court's judgment in that case was that if a state 
"decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' 
consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure 
whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained."208 
These examples suggest that once a court sees a problem as a ques-
tion of constitutional right, it is easily driven toward psychologic 
man's view of human relations - driven, that is, to treat the problem 
as one involving individuals, not families, to project an atomistic im-
age of the family, and to regard family problems as matters to be set-
tled between the law and a single member of the family. A 
constitutional right, after all, is a right an individual has against the 
government; that is the point of the state-action requirement. Where a 
right exists, we prima facie prefer the individual, as the law of substan-
tive due process illustrates. But the rights schema is often inapposite 
204. 428 U.S. at 68. 
205. 428 U.S. at 69. 
206. 428 U.S. at 93 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), in the passage in which the Court seemed to be justifying its discovery 
of a right to privacy, the Court listed the many "detriment[s] that the State would impose on the 
pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether .... " Except for the detriment of medical 
harm, of which the Court made oddly little, each of the detriments could be suffered by a father. 
207. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977), raises the 
same point as to contraception. 
208. 443 U.S. at 643 (footnote omitted). Massachusetts did decide to require parental con-
sent and did set up an alternative procedure. In the first two years of that procedure's operation, 
1300 girls sought judicial consent. All but four girls received authorization from the trial court, 
three of the girls who lost in the trial court won on appeal, and the fourth girl simply went to 
another state to receive her abortion. R. MNOOKIN, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in IN THE 
INTEREST OF CHILDREN 149 (1985) [hereinafter cited as IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN]. 
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in the family context, since there a right against the government is also 
a right against other family members.209 And because we dislike com-
promising a right against the government, we are inhibited from look-
ing for ways to encourage compromises or even discussion within the 
family.210 Indeed, the very appeal to law - to an external set of stan-
dards enforced by might - is atomistic in that it circumvents the (no 
doubt idealized) standards of family decision: private persuasion and 
eventual accommodation based on solicitude for the person with 
whom one disagrees. 
To put the point somewhat differently, our tendency to constitu-
tionalize family law and thus to think of it in terms of rights means 
that, when the law transfers moral decisions, it transfers them to indi-
viduals rather than to families, thus sustaining the image of the family 
as a collection of discrete individuals.211 And the rights approach 
must be, in one sense, hostile to moral discourse, because the resolu-
tion of moral problems must commonly be particularistic and delicate, 
while the promulgation and enforcement of rights is often generalistic 
and insensitive to nuance. 
Even where the "rights" approach is used to unite the components 
of the family in principle, it is likely to divide the members of the 
family in practice, because in such situations one member of the family 
is often using the law to force his way on others in the family. For 
example, those favoring visitation rights for grandparents justify them 
not only in terms of the interests of the child, but also in terms of the 
"rights" of the grandparents.212 Court-ordered visitation is presuma-
bly necessary only where the child's parent objects to such visitation, 
and we thus see the law compelling the parent to submit to the intru-
sion of that cliche and source of popular wit, the intermeddling in-law. 
A final irony of the "rights approach" is that the situation in which 
it is used most often to unite the family - when parents' rights are 
209. See generally C. Schneider, supra note 48. 
210. Cf Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SUP. Cr. REv. 329, 331 (characterizing 
the Supreme Court's role in family law jurisprudence as "addressing conflicting claims of individ-
ual and community, of liberty and authority"). 
211. The "rights" viewpoint probably sustains the tendency to think of families atomistically 
in other ways. For example - given the American enthusiasm for legalism and for thinking of 
problems in terms of-rights, given most people's ignorance of the state-action requirement and 
their consequent tendency to blur rights against the state and rights against other individuals, 
and given the tendency to believe that if you have a right, you use it or lose it- I suspect that, as 
family law becomes constitutionalized, people will increasingly tend to think of their intra-famil-
ial relations in terms of rights. 
212. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 40, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (which also reports that four 
"grandparents' rights organizations have been established for the purpose of focusing national, 
state, and local attention on the issue of grandparents' visitation rights"). 
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invoked to limit the state's interference in the family213 - is also the 
situation in which it can be abused to mistreat or even eject a member 
of the family.214 This possibility is most grimly raised when parents 
refuse lifesaving medical aid for their children.215 
Family law's movement toward contract likewise comports with 
psychologic man's tendency to see the family as a collection of individ-
uals united temporarily for their mutual convenience and armed with 
rights against each other. Contracts are, by definition, made between 
individuals competent to deal with each other at arm's length. Con-
tracts by definition give each individual rights against the other. And 
contracts by doctrine may be renounced, as long as the breaching 
party gives the other the benefit of that part of the bargain that can be 
reduced to economic terms. Indeed, if the breachµig party can com-
pensate the other party and still come out ahead, it is thought econom-
ically efficient - that is, socially desirable - for him to do so. 
Finally, psychologic man's view of families as made up of individu-
als is encouraged by and encourages egalitarianism. The practical 
problem with seeing the family as a unit is that units are often called 
upon to speak as units; and historically, when the family has spoken, 
the voice has been the husband's. Egalitarianism has had the greatest 
effect in financial matters,216 but it has also spurred the attack on 
spousal tort immunity, on the spousal testimonial privilege, and on the 
law's handling of spouse abuse. Egalitarianism may well be compati-
213. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
214. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). In Parham the Court held that as long as 
a state mental hospital's procedures made it likely that the decision to admit and retain a child 
was not arbitrary, no adversary proceeding need be held. One need not accept Justice Brennan's 
brutal intimation that any child sent to a state mental hospital has been "ousted" from his family 
to acknowledge that that can happen. Further, Parham's symbolic importance for the family is 
ambiguous. The holding is based in part on the notion that the law presumes parents make 
decisions in the interests of their children. But the Court also holds that no different procedures 
are necessary where the child is committed not by a parent but by the state acting for one of its 
wards, since "we cannot assume that when the State of Georgia has custody of a child it acts so 
differently from a natural parent in seeking medical assistance for the child." 442 U.S. at 618. 
215. See my discussion of the Phillip B. case, text at notes 50-52 supra. See also the argument 
by Dr. Raymond Duff as to neonatal euthanasia, an argument Professor Goldstein describes as 
"persuasive": 
Families know their values, priorities and resources better than anyone else. Presumably 
they, with the doctor, can make the better choices as a private affair. Certainly, they, more 
than anyone else, must live with the consequences. Most of these families know they cannot 
place that child for adoption because no one else wants the child. If they cannot cope ade-
quately with the child and their other responsibilities and survive as a family, they may feel 
that the death option is a forced choice. • . • But that is not necessarily bad, and who 
knows of a better way? 
Kelsey, Shall These Children Live? A Conversation With Dr. Raymond S. Duff, 12 REFLECTION 
4, 7 (1975) (Yale Divinity School Magazine), quoted in Goldstein, supra note 49, at 656. 
216. In those matters, egalitarianism's effect may actually have been to strengthen the view 
of the family as a unit by strengthening the presumption that the property of one spouse is the 
property of both. 
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ble with a view of the family as a unit; indeed, most modem views of 
the family as a unit are based on a view of husband and wife as equals. 
But family law's sense that the patriarchal concept of the family must 
be extirpated and compensated for has perhaps led to a form of egali-
tarianism whose effects can be atomistic. 
c. The search for self. Psychological man, as we have seen, con-
stantly seeks to find his unique "true self," to escape society's imposed 
roles. Family law, increasingly, lets him do so. This helps explain 
some of the appeal of recent attempts to ensure accurate, individual-
ized trials by expanding procedural rights, as the Court did in 
Santosky v. Kramer, 217 Lassiter v. North Carolina, 218 and Stanley v. 
Illinois.219 It also helps explain attempts to eliminate "stereotypes" as 
to child custody (by making inadmissible evidence about a parent's 
sexual habits where those habits do not demonstrably affect the par-
ent's ability to raise children and by weakening the tender-years pre-
sumption), as to illegitimacy (by eliminating disabilities based on a 
characteristic outside the control of the person affected), as to alimony 
and spousal support (by eliminating the assumption that the man 
should support the woman), and as to age (by allowing children to 
have an abortion without telling their parents if they can convince a 
court they need one). 
How these developments affect the quantum of moral discourse in 
the law is unclear. On one hand, treating people as they are individu-
ally rather than according to roles and generalizations could allow the 
law to make more complex moral judgments about them and their 
situations, and trials that produce more information about litigants 
might give courts more material with which to make fuller moral 
judgments. 
On the other hand, the "stereotypes" being attacked could also be 
seen as generalized resolutions of particular moral questions, and the 
attacks on those stereotypes as attempts to eliminate those moral ques-
tions from the law's purview and to substitute an inquiry into the par-
ticular psychological characteristics of the litigants and a search for 
the psychologic solution that "works." Furthermore, the effect of in-
dividualizing decisions is clouded by our ignorance about how legal 
217. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
218. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). I take the sensible view of that case propounded by Professor 
Besharov in Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent's Right to Counsel After Lassiter 
v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L.Q. 205, 217 (1981) (suggesting that "Lassiter may be the first 
evolutionary step in an ultimately revolutionary recognition of the due process right of indigents 
to appointed counsel in 'civil' proceedings" because "eight out of nine Justices opened the door 
to the future provision of counsel in some, if not all, termination proceedings"), 
219. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Cf. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
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actors decide cases where no rules guide their discretion. While indi-
vidualized decisions may permit more complex moral judgments, they 
may also make them less likely. Legal decisions are those made on the 
basis of rules, and legal decisionmakers thus tend to look for rules to 
guide them. Where a factor is not expressly embodied in a rule, it is 
perhaps likely to be excluded, at least from conscious decisionmak.ing. 
In other words, we simply do not know whether freeing the deci-
sionmaker from generalizations and rules will liberate him to make 
richer moral judgments or simply restrict the set of moral standards he 
is willing to employ. Finally, while the law expends much effort elabo-
rating and using procedures, it is not clear that the procedural reforms 
of family law actually alter the outcomes of cases. 220 It is thus possible 
that family law's procedural reforms might, anticlimactically, have lit-
tle effect on any kind of discourse. 
d. Removing false constraints. A further consequence of the psy-
chologic view is weightier than the preceeding consequence, for inso-
far as the law responds to that view's command to peel off society's 
false constraints and to that view's preference for pragmatism and flex-
ibility, the law will eliminate rules. Family law, as we have said, is 
gradually but widely doing just that. The most interesting evidence of 
the law's direction here is in the area of substantive due process, where 
the personal right to be free of a legal rule directly confronts the state's 
moral or social justification for the rule. 
For present purposes, the significance of substantive due process is 
that the Court has used both sides of the substantive due process equa-
tion in ways that suggest a predisposition to peel off rules. The 
Court's treatment of the personal rights side of the equation has been 
expansive to an extent made remarkable by the obscure origins of the 
"right to privacy." Its handling of the state-interest side of the equa-
tion shares the imprecision of its handling of the rights side, but the 
former is as narrow as the latter is broad: The Court almost invariably 
finds that the state interests advanced in support of a statute that in-
fringes on a "fundamental" constitutional right are insufficient to jus-
tify the statute. No doubt the Court sometimes peeks at the state's 
interests before it decides whether the right violated is fundamental. 
But as Professor Nagel showed in his celebrated Note,221 the Court's 
application of the state-interest test has been so mechanical, so clumsy, 
so literalistic, that one may infer that the Court is not sensitive to 
many of the moral purposes of states. 
220. See, e.g., Wald & Chambers, Smith v. OFFER, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 
supra note 208, at 67. 
221. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). 
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The removal of false constraints is, in part, a removal of the reli-
gious and social conventions that, we noted earlier, psychologic man 
need use only instrumentally and pragmatically. Psychologic man's 
antinomianism neatly complements the American commitment to plu-
ralism. That antinomianism, in other words, like American pluralism, 
acknowledges the possible importance and usefulness of beliefs and 
conventions, but denies that any particular belief or convention has 
inherent or independent justification. Under both views, many beliefs 
and conventions should be available to be used in a society; none 
should be imposed by it. 
e. The psychologic view of human nature. Another consequence 
of the psychologic view arises from psychological man's assessment of 
the goodness and perfectibility of human nature. Curiously, both sides 
of that ambivalence may diminish moral discourse in family law. 
First, insofar as the psychologic view is pessimistic about the mallea-
bility of man, and sees man as governed by passions he cannot under-
stand and cannot resist, it calls for the law to make as few attempts to 
regulate him as possible. This is the attitude reflected in the aphorisms 
endemic in discussions of family law: "You can't change human na-
ture." "You can't legislate morality." Psychologic man's particular 
pessimism about the capacity of social institutions is widely echoed in 
the increasingly expressed doubts about, for example, the state's abil-
ity to intervene satisfactorily in child custody disputes,222 to provide 
adequate foster care, or to furnish decently run, effective asylums for 
retarded or mentally ill children.223 This pessimism, in other words, 
increases sensitivity to the enforcement difficulties that, we have seen, 
recur in family law. 
Second, insofar as the psychologic view is optimistic about man's 
nature, it would still require the law to make few attempts to guide or 
regulate him. Indeed, on this view it may be the constraints them-
selves that are the problem.224 Thus both consequences of the psycho-
logic view diminish the desirability of regulation of families, and both 
therefore diminish the law's need to evaluate the moral problems of 
families. 
f. The nature of privacy. The final consequence of the psycho-
logic view concern~ the fundamental rights side of the substantive due 
process test - specifically, the right to privacy. I said that the psycho-
222. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OP 
THE CHILD (1979). 
223. Some of these doubts may actually be based as well on an optimistic view of humans, for 
the doubts often rest on a belief that even despondent, troubled, and ill people can get along 
better for themselves in society than is commonly supposed. 
224. See Part IV. D. 1. supra. 
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logic view's attitude toward privacy is paradoxical.225 That view 
seems at first to demand privacy, but its adherents seem not to seek it 
nor the doctrine, on reflection, to require it. For its part, the law has 
elevated "privacy" to a fundamental right. I suggest that the law's 
"privacy" is the kind of "privacy" the psychological view requires. 
That kind is not privacy in the sense of secrecy; secrecy psychologic 
man seems not to want, and the law abandoned it as a protected right 
when it moved from Griswold to Eisenstadt. The privacy psychologic 
man needs is the kind the law comes closer to granting - autonomy 
from state control. And this is the kind of privacy that, when elevated 
to a right, is peculiarly incompatible with the law's moral discourse, 
for once a right to autonomy from state control is found, the issue of 
state intervention on "moral" grounds vel non is largely resolved and 
the state's moral interest is virtually irrelevant. 
g. A concluding comparison. I conclude our consideration of the 
legal reactions to the psychologic view of man by proposing a modest 
analogy between the rising view of family law and the rise of classical 
liberalism. Each has its prototypical man: psychologic man for one, 
economic man for the other. Those personality types are in Professor 
Rieff's view related: "We will recognize the case history of psycholog-
ical man the nervous habits of his father, economic man: he is anti-
heroic, shrewd, carefully counting his satisfactions and dissatisfac-
tions, studying unprofitable commitments as the sins most to be 
avoided."226 Each type believes the greatest good for the greatest 
number is to be had by allowing the market, in goods or in "interper-
sonal relations," to work as free of government regulation as possible. 
Each view is primarily associated with the bourgeoisie. Each favors 
the contract as the market's mechanism, and thus family law has seen 
the rise of the antenuptial contract, the postnuptial contract, contracts 
for surrogate motherhood,227 a contractual view of career choices 
made by husbands and wives, and hostility to contractors preferred by 
status.228 Both were born in attacks on an older system of law and 
mores; and both employ egalitarianism in making those attacks. Both 
raise the questions to which we will shortly tum. 
3. A Case Study: Roe v. Wade 
Up to this point, I have described the trend toward diminished 
moral discourse in family law and the transfer of moral decision from 
225. See Part IV. D. 1. e. supra. 
226. P. RIEFF, FREUD: THE MIND OF THE MORALIST, 356 (3d ed. 1979). 
227. The legal effectiveness of which is uncertain. 
228. Thus we see attacks on the preference for women in alimony and child-custody cases. 
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family law in necessarily general terms. At this point, I will attempt to 
make the nature of the trend clearer through extended exegesis of a 
specific text. I have chosen Roe v. Wade,229 the Court's well-known 
abortion opinion, as that test. I have done so for several reasons. 
First, Roe is an important case, the opinion - whatever its quality -
was carefuly considered, and the opinion and the problems it raises 
will be familiar to many readers. Second, Roe exemplifies the trend 
toward diminished moral discourse well: it not only removes from the 
law's (if not politics') purview a major moral issue, it does so without 
addressing that moral issue. Third, Roe illustrates the fit between psy-
chologic man and modem family law in general and between the psy-
chologic view and substantive due process in particular. 
I said earlier that an expansive treatment of the private-rights side 
of the substantive due process equation typified the modem approach 
to family law. Just how expansive that treatment is may be seen in 
Roe. The case turns on the constitutional "right to privacy," a right 
inferred from the fourteenth amendment's provision that no state may 
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law. Since little in the language, structure, or intent of the clause es-
tablishes the nature or limits of that right, since the Court has never 
defined those limits, since the right has little to do with "privacy" in 
the colloquial sense, and since the right of privacy is a "greedy" 
one,230 the right has long seemed menacingly capacious. The Court in 
Roe opens its discussion of the right to privacy with a sentence that 
acknowledges that the Constitution mentions no such right.231 In its 
next two sentences, the Court attempts to identify the origin of the 
right: 
In a line of decisions ... going back perhaps as far as ... [1891], the 
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of 
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In 
varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at 
least the roots of that right in the First Amendment . . .; in the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments . . .; in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights . . .; 
in the Ninth Amendment . . .; or in the concept ofliberty guaranteed by 
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... 232 
After this disjunctive jumble of precedent (which may establish no 
more than "the roots of that right"), and after adding that the right 
has "some extension to activities relating to" various family law issues, 
229. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
230. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in PRIVACY 182 (J, Pennock & J. Chapman 
eds. 1971). 
231. 410 U.S. at 152. 
232. 410 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added). 
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the Court closes its attempt to define and defend the right, having es-
tablished neither the principle that justifies nor the principle that lim-
its it. 
Nevertheless, the Court next says, "This right of privacy . . . is 
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to ter-
minate her pregnancy."233 Why that right is "broad enough" the 
Court does not say. The Court does follow this sentence with a list of 
"detriments" a woman would suffer who could not have an abortion, 
and one may infer that it is the severity of the detriments that gives 
rise to the right. But while the Court cannot mean that "detriments" 
create rights - since all statutes impose "detriments," and since most 
"detriments" do not give rise to a legal right - the Court does not say 
why detriments create a right here, or why these particular detriments 
create this particular right. 
One might suppose that Roe is an example of the trend toward 
transferring the moral decision whether a particular abortion is justifi-
able from the state to the citizen. That is, of course, its effect. But the 
Court seems uninterested in building any argument for the wisdom of 
such a transfer. Indeed, when the Court reflects on the nature of the 
decision whether to have an abortion, the "factors the woman and her 
responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation"234 turn 
out to be those consonant with the psychologic viewpoint. That is, 
they are largely "therapeutic," having almost exclusively to do with 
the woman's medical and psychological health, although other factors 
presumably, if vaguely, enter in one sentence: "There is also the dis-
tress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there 
is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psycho-
logically and otherwise, to care for it."235 But the central question of 
the morality of abortion itself, the subsidiary moral questions about 
the extent to which the woman's conduct and situation influence the 
morality of her particular abortion, and the moral questions about 
how the abortion affects the woman's relations with the father of the 
child are all conspicuously absent. 
The Court's "therapeutic" viewpoint is similarly apparent in the 
centrality of the role it sees for the doctor. So powerful is that view-
point that at one point the Court actually attributes primary responsi-
bility for the decision to the doctor: "the attending physician, in 
consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation 
by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy 
233. 410 U.S. at 153. 
234. 410 U.S. at 153. 
235. 410 U.S. at 153. 
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should be terminated."236 Significantly, the Court seems not to expect 
that the doctor will give the woman the empirical medical information 
as to the nature of fetal life about which he should be expert and which 
many people believe relevant to the moral propriety of abortion. Nor 
does the Court acknowledge that there is hardly any medical expertise, 
except where continued pregnancy will endanger the mother's health, 
relevant to the decision whether to have an abortion. Nevertheless, 
the Court stresses that the doctor will be consulted - will be worth 
consulting and available for consultation - on the psychological, so-
cial, and moral issues the Court believes are relevant to the decision. 
When the Court in Roe turns to the state's interests, it feints to-
ward dealing with the central moral question the case presents -
whether abortions destroy something we value in the way we value 
human life. But the Court immediately veers off to ask whether the 
fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, 
on the theory that, if it were, "of course . . . the fetus' right to life 
would ... be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment."237 The 
Court then embarks on a macabre inquiry into whether the Constitu-
tion ever refers to a "person" when it also means a fetus. The Court 
canvasses, inter alia, the apportionment clause, the emolument clause, 
the electors provisions, the provision setting qualifications for the pres-
idency, and the extradition provisions, and discovers that "in nearly 
all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application 
only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any 
possible pre-natal application."238 
The Court then returns to its central moral problem, but declines 
to confront it: 
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When 
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and 
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this 
point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to 
speculate as to the answer.239 
Thus relying on its own incapacity to resolve the question of when life 
begins, and without explaining its reasoning, the Court says that "by 
236. 410 U.S. at 163. 
237. 410 U.S. at 156-57. Perhaps Justice Blackmun is correct, but his conclusion does not 
follow from the language of the fourteenth amendment, which only prohibits states, not private 
citizens, from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
238. 410 U.S. at 157. Ironically, the Court has held that corporations are "persons" within 
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. If a fetus could incorporate under state law, would it 
be a person, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment? Justice Blackmun's discussion 
reminds one of Punch's railroad conductor, who says, "Cats is dogs and rabbits is dogs, but 
tortoises is hinsects and goes free." 
239. 410 U.S. at 159. 
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adopting one theory of life, Texas may [not] override the rights of the 
pregnant woman that are at stake. " 240 
The Court's attitude in Roe fits well with the moral skepticism and 
relativism that are part of psychologic man's world view. Courts may 
reasonably respond to the increased respectability of those attitudes by 
looking skeptically at moral justifications for statutes. But they might 
just as reasonably respond by deferring to any plausible moral justifi-
cation propounded by the branch of government whose function is to 
represent democratic opinion. This latter response seems particularly 
appropriate in Roe, for if "the respective disciplines of medicine, phi-
losophy, and theology" can't agree, the legislature's choice must be 
backed by some substantial arguments from each discipline. Further, 
the legislature's choice can, in principle, be better informed than the 
Court's (because the legislature has, if it will use them, better facilities 
for gathering information), and it can, as it always has, represent pub-
lic opinion as to how society should define and protect human life. In 
Roe, as in other substantive due process cases, the Court has avoided 
examining all the possible rationales for a statute, although conven-
tional doctrine prescribes otherwise.241 And among the unexplored 
rationales is what is surely a common one - that the state is protect-
ing the state's classic police power interest in morality.242 The Court 
has announced (in an obscenity case) that such a rationale is legitimate 
(although the Court did not decide whether it is also "compelling").243 
In sum, the Court uses the rhetorical device of implying that the legis-
lature made an arbitrary choice between arbitrary definitions to avoid 
dealing directly either with the crucial moral issue presented by the 
case or with the justification for holding that the legislature could not 
legitimately consider and decide that moral issue. 
The Roe Court's next steps further demonstrate the artificial, ad 
hoc nature of the Court's state-interest analysis and of the Court's re-
fusal to explain its decision in moral (or even morally comprehensible) 
terms. Although the Court had denied that Texas could, by defining 
"life," deprive a woman of her right to decide whether to have an 
240. 410 U.S. at 162. 
241. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234-35 (1981). 
242. As Justice Harlan wrote, 
[T]he very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns indicates that society 
is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-being of the community, but has tradi-
tionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to attempt a 
line between public behavior and that which is purely consensual or solitary would be to 
withdraw from community concern a range of subjects with which every society in civilized 
times has found it necessary to deal. 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
243. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973). 
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abortion, the Court next finds that Texas has an "important and legiti-
mate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life," and that 
that interest "grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term, 
and at a point during pregnancy, . . . becomes 'compelling.' "244 The 
Court then holds that that point is reached at "viability,"245 which the 
Court indicates is reached after twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks of 
pregnancy. "This is so because the fetus then presumably has the ca-
pability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb.''246 The Court 
does not say why its definition of "meaningful life" (which deprives a 
woman of a constitutional right to an abortion in the last trimester) is 
reasonable when the legislature's is not. Nor does the Court say why 
the "potentiality of life" which the Court concedes exists through the 
second trimester is not something the state may protect. 
One approach to these questions is suggested by the practice, in 
substantive due process cases, of striking the balance between the indi-
vidual and the state "having regard to what history teaches are the 
traditions from which [the country] developed as well as the traditions 
from which it broke.''247 On one view, then, courts might substitute 
an analysis of the law's historical treatment of a moral problem for a 
direct analysis of the moral problem itself. This might be the purpose 
of Justice Blackmun's curious historical excursion in Roe. However, 
the Court's use of history, for whatever purpose it is advanced, is dis-
quieting. 248 It begins by noting that, while the Persians severely pun-
ished abortion, the Greeks and the Romans did not.249 Justice 
Blackmun agonizes for two pages over the awkwardness that the Hip-
pocratic Oath flatly proscribes abortions. He concedes that with the 
rise of Christianity, "[t]he Oath 'became the nucleus of all medical 
ethics' and 'was applauded as the embodiment of truth,' " and he con-
cedes that the oath is "a long-accepted and revered statement of medi-
cal ethics."250 Nevertheless, he discovers that "the late Dr. Edelstein" 
thought the oath " 'a Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of 
an absolute standard of medical conduct.' " 251 He thinks this "a satis-
factory and acceptable explanation of the Hippocratic Oath's apparent 
rigidity."252 It is revealingly indicative of the psychologic attitude of 
244. 410 U.S. at 162-63. 
245. 410 U.S. at 163. 
246. 410 U.S. at 163. 
247. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
248. See Note, supra note 16, at 268-69 n.84. 
249. 410 U.S. at 130. 
250. 410 U.S. at 132. 
251. 410 U.S. at 132. 
252. 410 U.S. at 132. 
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the opinion that that "apparent rigidity" is something that needs to be 
explained away instead of accepted as a statement of a considered 
moral judgment. 
The Court then reports that the common law may have made 
abortion after quickening a crime; that in 1821 American states began 
to make such abortions criminal; and that, beginning in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, abortions before quickening were also made 
criminal. The Court concludes that "throughout the major portion of 
the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under 
most American statutes currently in effect."253 But the Court's own 
history demonstrates that abortion itself was condemned by the rele-
vant ethical tradition for two thousand years, that never in the history 
of Anglo-American law was there any doubt about the state's power to 
prohibit abortion,254 that abortion before quickening was criminalized 
by statute in the early-middle nineteenth century, that abortion before 
quickening was criminalized as soon as anyone could diagnose preg-
nancy before quickening, and that abortion has been a felony in virtu-
ally every state for a century.255 
Finally, Roe is consonant with the psychologic viewpoint sociologi-
cally and tends to confirm the sociological amendment to the hypothe-
sis propounded in Part II. B. Crudely put, the same groups that most 
partake of the psychologic outlook also have the most liberal views of 
abortion, while those groups that partake of it least have the most 
conservative views of abortion. Indeed, abortion is an issue that is 
being used in the political debate over the desirability of the psycho-
logic world view, a debate in which positions are greatly influenced by 
social class. 256 
My point is not to show yet again that the opinion in Roe is un-
commonly unpersuasive. 257 Rather it is to propose that that unper-
suasiveness indicates that the explanation for the Court's result lies, 
more than usually, outside the realm of theories embedded in judicial 
253. 410 U.S. at 140. 
254. Indeed, by the Court's own testimony Bracton held that abortion was murder, and Coke 
and Blackstone both thought it criminal. 410 U.S. at 134-36. See also Gavigan, The Criminal 
Sanction as it Relates to Human Reproduction: The Genesis of the Statutory Prohibition of Abor-
tion, 5 J. LEGAL HIST. 20 (1984). 
255. The usual tactic at this point is to discover in our history a pattern of allegiance to some 
"deeper" value which dictates recognizing the presence of a constitutional right. But the Court 
does not make that argument (unless it can be said to do so in the casual listing of precedent I 
described above at note 232), and instead presents us with the history I have just analyzed. 
256. See K. LUKER, supra note 68, at 7-8. 
257. The opinion was attacked in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 926-32 
(1978); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); 
Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: the Abortion Cases, 1973 Sur. Cr. REV. 
159; Morgan, supra note 65. 
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decision. It is, further, to suggest that the result of Roe and the 
Court's attitude toward substantive due process doctrine are conso-
nant with the viewpoint of psychologic man.258 
E. A Brief Speculation on the Future of the Trend 
If the changes that we fear be thus irresistible, what remains but to ac-
quiesce with silence, as in the other insurmountable distresses of human-
ity? It remains that we retard what we cannot repel, that we palliate 
what we cannot cure. 
- Samuel Johnson 
Preface to the 
Dictionary (1755) 
We do not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration 
upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind. 
- Oliver Wendell Holmes 
The Path of The Law (1897) 
I have described four causes of the trend toward diminished moral 
discourse in family law: the tradition of nonintervention in the family, 
the ideology of liberal individualism, changing moral views of family 
relations, and the rise of psychologic man. I suspect, but do not insist, 
that these causes will persist, and that the trend itself will therefore 
continue. The first factor may persist because the tradition of family 
autonomy is well-seated, and because the problems of enforcement 
are, in some ways, increasingly severe. The second factor may persist, 
despite the forces like television that tend to homogenize society, be-
cause immigration continues, a culture of poverty remains, groups 
with a self-conscious identity proliferate, and pluralism has more overt 
ideological attraction than ever before. The third factor may persist as 
upper-middle-class Christianity continues to lose its influence and its 
traditional view of morals. The fourth factor may persist as the social 
forces described in the preceding section encourage people to look to 
themselves for gratification and as the "helping professions" and their 
auxiliaries burgeon. 
The trend is also impelled by the synergistic effect of the four fac-
tors. That is, the four factors reinforce each other in ways complex 
beyond recounting. For example, the enforcement problem is given 
258. Several other attitudes I have discussed may also have contributed, sub rosa, to the 
result. Among these is egalitarianism: the Court may have been sensitive to the fact that rich 
women could by 1973 secure abortions distinctly more easily than poor women and to the femi• 
nist sentiment that helped propel abortion reform. And the Court may, at some level, have 
feared the ugly enforcement problems of abortion regulation. See generally Zimring, supra note 
128. 
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depth and importance by liberal individualism. Liberal individual-
ism's view of the world is given resonance by psychologism, in ways 
suggested by the analogy I made between psychologic and economic 
man.259 The social weakening and doctrinal liberalization of main-
stream Protestantism is caused and encouraged by liberal individual-
ism's view that adherence to religion is a purely individual choice that 
family and tradition should not influence. 260 The psychological view 
increases resistance to government regulation of private life, thereby 
intensifying the enforcement difficulty. 
In short, the four causes interrelate endlessly, because they are all 
prominent parts of the culture that produced American family law 
and within which that law acts. Furthermore, the four causes are 
themselves caused by larger underlying social trends. Insofar as those 
trends continue to invigorate the four causes, the trend toward dimin-
ished moral discourse in family law seems likely to continue. 
None of this is inevitable, however; it is the most common and 
most false assumption of social prediction that, once begun, a trend 
must continue. Trends of exactly the kind I discuss in this paper have 
been reversed before. For example, sexual mores in eighteenth-cen-
tury England were, if anything, relaxed, but they tightened remarka-
bly in the nineteenth century. Each of the causes I have described 
could come to be perceived as pernicious, and since such perceptions 
can spread quickly in modern societies, each factor could change ab-
ruptly. Forces we cannot now predict - social, economic, political, 
and technological changes (like the nineteenth century's "discovery" 
of the asylum,261 the Vietnamese War, the Depression, and the pill)-
can work large and unexpected shifts, some temporary, some pro-
tracted, in social life. 
There is, furthermore, a force whose presence we cannot forget, 
but whose future we cannot predict - a force roughly described as 
reinvigorated conservatism, politicized fundamentalism, and tradi-
tional Roman Catholicism. This "new conservatism" holds that many 
family law issues are of central importance, wishes to reinstate many 
of the morally based prohibitions of family law, and seeks to revive 
many of the moral bases for decision in family law. It could well sum-
mon the strength to work significant political changes, as the temper-
ance movement, even as late as the second decade of the twentieth 
259. See HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 5, at ch. 6, for an extended examination of the 
relationship between psychologism and individualism in the United States. 
260. Id. at ch. 9. 
261. See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE AsYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISOR-
DER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971). But see Schneider, The Rise of Prisons and the Origins of 
the Rehabilitative Ideal (Book Review), 77 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1979). 
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century, did with Prohibition. Perhaps ironically, such changes are 
made somewhat more possible by the constitutionalization of family 
law. The popular sense that the Court has taken too much on itself is 
growing,262 and, since Roe v. Wade, that sense has been directed par-
ticularly toward family law issues. Thus some of the changes I have 
described could be reversed as the composition of the Supreme Court 
changes. 263 
It is at least true that, as the political power of conservatism has 
increased in the last few years, its attitudes have affected the degree 
and nature of moral discourse in many areas of family law. Consider 
the controversy over abortion, perhaps the most prominent of the "so-
cial issues" that disturb conservatives. A number of state legislatures 
have continued to enact measures intended to find the constitutional 
limits of the state's power to regulate abortion; and Congress has con-
tinued to restrict the use of federal funds to pay for abortions. The 
conservative reaction is also visible, for instance, in the Reagan admin-
istration's "Baby Doe" regulations,264 an attempt to retrieve for public 
decision a moral choice that had been left to parents and doctors. 
In addition, the conservative reaction has sometimes allied itself, 
however oddly, with the women's movement in ways that have stimu-
lated moral discourse. Thus the last few years have seen an efflores-
cence of statutes attempting to enforce child-support obligations.265 
Under the aegis of that same coalition, the view of domestic violence 
as a "sickness" is being challenged by a reinvigorated view of it as 
"badness," a view expressed in new sex-offender legislation.266 
The new conservative moral view has thus injected moral discourse 
into the law, and it has certainly become prominent in political and 
social discourse. But the extent to which that moral view has been 
enacted into law is less dramatic than the vehemence of political and 
262. See M. JANOWITZ, THE LAST HALF-CENTURY 379-83 (1978). Janowitz reports: 
[I]n 1949, 83.4% of the population expressed approval and trust in the Supreme Court, but 
by 1973, the figure had decreased to 32.6%. The Harris Survey for 1975 showed even lower 
"confidence"; namely, 28% ..•. [T]his drop was more extensive than for any other institu-
tion in the United States. 
Id. at 383 (footnote omitted). 
263. But cf THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi 
ed. 1983). 
264. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14 (1985) (requiring states to institute systems to respond to reports 
that newly born infants have been denied medical treatment). 
265. See note 20 supra. One might also note as products of the same coalition the recent 
attempts, occasionally successful, to pass local ordinances restricting pornography. Indianapolis, 
Ind., Gen. Ordinances 24 (Apr. 23, 1984), 35 (June 11, 1984) (held unconstitutionally vague in 
American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), ajfd., 771 F.2d 323 
(7th Cir. 1985), ajfd. per curiam, 54 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1986) (No. 85-1090)); Minne-
apolis, Minn., Ordinance Relating to Civil Rights (Dec. 30, 1983) (vetoed Jan. 5, 1984). 
266. See Weisberg, supra note 47, at 45-55. 
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social discussion of it suggests. For example, despite the prominence 
of the abortion issue, none of the attempts to reverse or seriously un-
dermine Roe v. Wade has been successful. Or consider what was to 
have been the legislative centerpiece of the new conservative view of 
the family - the Family Protection Act. 267 That bill was intended to 
"preserve the integrity of the American family, to foster and protect 
the viability of American family life by emphasizing family responsi-
bilities in education, tax assistance, religion, and other areas related to 
the family, and to promote the virtues of the family."268 It would 
have, inter alia, instituted a presumption in favor of an expansive in-
terpretation of parental rights; required parental notification whenever 
a program receiving federal funds gave abortion or contraception 
counseling or services; required federal programs not to change state 
legislation on juvenile delinquency, child abuse, or spouse abuse; pre-
vented federal funds from being used to promote homosexuality "as a 
life style" or to provide legal services for securing a divorce; and exten-
sively amended tax and education law in ways thought to secure the 
general purpose of the bill. The bill's scope is thus striking; its appeal 
to a substantial portion of the population is clear; and it probably 
would not have received the attention the press has paid it had it been 
introduced earlier. For our purposes, however, perhaps the significant 
fact is that the bill has never become law. 
Similarly revealing of the strength and limits of the new conserva-
tive moral view is the example of the Adolescent Family Life Pro-
gram. Under the Carter Administration, the Office of Adolescent 
Pregnancy Programs had been "a small service program for pregnant 
teenagers"269 whose underlying rationale was not that it is wrong for 
teenagers to have sexual relations, but rather that teenage pregnancy is 
a problem for the teenager and society, to be solved by whatever prac-
tical means are available. After President Reagan had been elected 
and the Republicans had won control of the Senate, Senator Jeremiah 
Denton proposed legislation270 designed to "promote self-discipline 
and chastity, and other positive, family-centered approaches to the 
problems of adolescent promiscuity [i.e., sexual intercourse out of 
wedlock] and adolescent pregnancy."271 One might have anticipated 
that Senator Denton's legislation would have had clear sailing: he was 
267. S. 1378, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
268. S. 1378, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1981). 
269. M. Vinovskis, Historical and Political Perspectives on Adolescent Pregnancy 44 (un-
published manuscript). The material in this paragraph is drawn from Professor Vinovskis' illu-
minating study of the history and politics of contraception and adolescent pregnancy. 
270. S. 1090, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 7968 (1981). 
271. s. 1090, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 7969, § 190l(b)(I) (1981). 
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opposed by no significant interest group, he expressed the feelings of a 
significant and angry portion of the population, and his views might 
easily have been seen as a way of reducing the costs of welfare. In the 
end, however, Senator Denton had to remove the bill's condemnation 
of teenage sexual activity, had to compromise on the bill's attempt to 
attack the use of abortion as a solution to teenage pregnancy, and had 
to concede that only a quarter of the funds allocated to the program 
should be used to prevent premarital sex among teenagers. Thus, 
although "the new emphasis on preventing premarital sexual activity 
nicely illustrates the dramatic recent political and moral changes that 
occurred in the Congress and the White House in 1981,"272 the change 
is far more modest than one might expect. 
The new conservative movement has undoubtedly brought relig-
iously motivated people into politics. It has no doubt "shaped 
America's political agenda in a negative fashion by discouraging the 
raising of issues such as public funding of abortions . . . . "273 But the 
movement's strength has limits. Some of those limits derive from the 
reluctance of significant elements of the Republican party to become 
involved in issues so controversial. Some of the limits derive from the 
fact that, prominent as the "social issues" are in public discussion, 
they seem to have startlingly little effect on the outcome of elec-
tions. 274 Some of the limits derive from the reluctance of conserva-
tives to use the federal government to achieve their ends. 275 And of 
course the federal government is not well-placed to affect the many 
areas of family law that are historically confided to the states, like di-
vorce law, the law of alimony, the law regulating marital property, 
child custody law, and so on. Finally, it is worth recalling that, even 
though the country is generally more conservative now than a decade 
ago, attitudes relating to the family and sexual relations seem to have 
resisted the conservative trend. 
Finally, one other factor that may help perpetuate the trend to-
ward diminution of moral discourse in family law should be men-
tioned: The trend itself becomes one of its own causes. As moral 
272. M. Vinovskis, supra note 269, at 60. 
273. G. PEELE, supra note 68, at 119. 
274. See, e.g., Jackson & Vinovskis, Public Opinion, Elections, and the "Single Issue," in THE 
ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 64 (G. Steiner ed. 1983); Vinovskis, Abortion 
and the Presidential Election of 1976: A Multivariate Analysis of Voting Behavior, 77 MICH. L. 
REv. 1750 (1979), reprinted in, THE LAW AND PoLmcs OF ABORTION, supra note 65, at 184; 
Vinovskis, The Politics of Abortion in the House of Representatives in 1976, in THE LAW AND 
POLITICS OF ABORTION, supra note 65, at 224. 
275. This consideration helped shape conservative attitudes toward Senator Denton's bill. 
M. Vinovskis, supra note 269. 
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discourse in family law becomes rarer, judges, legislators, and the pub-
lic are increasingly likely to feel that such discourse is inappropriate. 
V. RECAPITULATION: WHAT NEXT? 
All binding engagements to communal purpose may be considered, in 
the wisdom of therapeutic doctrines, too extreme. . . . It is in this sense 
that the contemporary moral revolution is anti-political; more precisely, 
it serves the purposes of the present anti-politics, representing a calm 
and profoundly reasonable revolt of the private man against all doctrinal 
traditions urging the salvation of self through identification with the pur-
poses of community. 
- Philip Rieff 
The Triumph of the Therapeutic (1966) 
And as I sat there brooding on the old, unknown world, I thought of 
Gatsby's wonder when he first picked out the green light at the end of 
Daisy's dock. He had come a long way to this blue lawn, and his dream 
must have seemed so close that he could hardly fail to grasp it. He did 
not know that it was already behind him, somewhere back in that vast 
obscurity beyond the city, where the dark fields of the republic rolled on 
under the night. 
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by 
year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that's no matter - to-
morrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther. . . . And one 
fine morning -
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into 
the past. 
- F. Scott Fitzgerald 
The Great Gatsby (1925) 
I began this paper by intimating that the study of moral discourse 
in family law can direct our attention to some of the basic problems 
underlying family law. The reader will have noticed many of these 
problems along the way. I will close by describing one group of them 
and suggesting some ways in which their study might be pursued. . 
Implicit in this paper, and underlying any systematic inquiry into 
family law, is a concern with what sociologists call "culture." Every 
culture 
has two main functions: (1) to organize the moral demands men make 
upon themselves into a system of symbols that make men intelligible and 
trustworthy to each other, thus rendering also the world intelligible and 
trustworthy; (2) to organize the expressive remissions by which men re-
lease themselves, in some degree, from the strain of conforming to the 
controlling symbolic, internalized variant readings of culture that consti-
tute individual character.276 
276. P. RIEFF, supra note 160, at 232-33. 
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Culture in this sense is central to family life; culture in this sense is 
centrally learned in family life. And culture in this sense is a central 
concern of the law; courts are even now admonished to help formulate 
society's "values."277 But the moral demands men make upon them-
selves are changing; some of the people I have quoted suggest that 
those demands are so diminished that "the social order lacks either a 
culture that is a symbolic expression of any vitality or a moral impulse 
that is a motivational or binding force. What then," these people ask, 
"can hold the society together?"278 
A study of family law in light of these questions must be illuminat-
ing, since it will direct us to the hopes and history that have, however 
indirectly, shaped the law. And an investigation of these questions as 
they are presented in family law may be even more rewarding. For 
family law, since it deals with society's basic unit, since it deals with 
the formation and perpetuation of basic social attitudes, since it is the 
voice through which society speaks, is in one sense the easiest case for 
the proposition that common values may (and should) be expressed 
through law. Yet family law is, in another sense, also the hardest case 
for that proposition, since expressing common values through family 
law interjects the state into the most private part of life. 
In view of these concerns, a justification of the trend toward dimin-
ished moral discourse in family law would argue that we live in a so-
cially pluralist, morally relativist, and largely secular society; that law 
practically must and philosophically should regulate the family 
lightly, allowing everyone as much social and moral leeway as possi-
ble. It would argue that, whatever might hold society together, it is 
not law, and surely not family law. 
Yet any society must socialize its young and enforce its basic 
norms. Does family law's avoidance of moral discourse and decision 
inhibit those tasks? The modern mood is to think not, is to believe 
that although the morality of public behavior is important to law, the 
morality of private behavior is not. Yet even some of those most com-
277. See the list of commentators compiled in Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 353, 358-60 (1981). "Whenever I hear the word 'value,' I reach for my wal-
let .•. " P. RIEFF, FELLOW TEACHERS 7 n.4 (1973). 
278. D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 84 (1978). This question 
and these issues have, of course, absorbed sociologists since Durkheim and Weber. But just as 
this article was being completed, a flourishing of books speaking directly to these problems -
and particularly to the role of moral discourse in and the problems for social cohesion posed by 
the modern state and liberal individualism - emerged. See, for example, HABITS OF THE 
HEART, supra note 5; R. MERELMAN, MAKING SOMETHING OF OURSELVES: ON CULTURE 
AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984); W. SULLIVAN, RECONSfRUCTING PUBLIC PHI-
LOSOPHY (1982). These works have in turn been influenced, as I have, by A. MACINTYRE, 
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mitted to the modem mood find times when they wish to express 
through the law their moral outrage at some kinds of private behavior, 
and at these times they often see social benefits in doing so. For exam-
ple, even people committed to "neutral" family law argue for the de-
terrent and educative benefits of automatic criminal prosecutions of 
spouse abusers. Any society must give its members a sense of stability 
and mutual concern. Is some commonality of belief about the central 
moral issues family law poses necessary to that sense? In other words, 
can a liberal, secular, pluralist, individualist society be a moral com-
munity? Can a society prosper that is not a moral community? 
One approach to such questions is historical. Sociologists regu-
larly urge the virtues of cultural coherence by comparing the present 
to a past in which people lived in communities harmonized by a com-
mon moral view. Historians too look back from Gesellschaft to 
Gemeinschaft, and see a Paradise before the Fall. But the paradise is 
always the period just before the one the historian is studying; it is 
always the introductory chapter of his book. Gemeinschaft is always 
around the comer we just turned. 
But let me speak less globally. Was there ever actually a time 
when family law could rely for its coherence on a unified moral image 
of the family? This is a question we cannot now answer for lack of 
evidence, but it is one historians of family law could profitably ad-
dress, as I will try to show by suggesting both some reasons to expect 
such a period and some doubts about those reasons. 
Two factors combine to suggest that, at some point in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century, law might have produced a moral im-
age of the family, and not just moral discourse about it. The first fac-
tor is the development in the early part of the nineteenth century of 
not only the modem family, but also of a public ideology of the family, 
a morality of domesticity based on an aspirational, religiously based -
though not just religious - set of views about the moral relations of 
family members. The second factor is the extraordinary modernity of 
family law: it is in surprising part a product of the nineteenth century. 
The list of family law subjects that were either invented or greatly 
reformed in the nineteenth century contains, we should remind our-
selves, virtually every important part of that law, including the law 
governing marriage formalities, divorce, alimony, marital property, 
the division of marital property, child custody, adoption, child sup-
port, child abuse and neglect, contraception, and abortion. In other 
words, new law was being made just when, or just after, society 
evolved a new moral image of the family. The conditions were apt for 
the transfer of that image to the law. 
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But to have doubted one's own first hypotheses is the mark of 
modern man, and I have many doubts. First, one must wonder 
whether the early nineteenth century genuinely had a coherent moral 
image of the family. True, several historians have written plausibly 
about the new image of the family, but other historians have not yet 
tried to find competing images or to describe the kinds of resistance to 
the new image. We do not know enough about class, regional, or eth-
nic differences that might have produced divergent views of family 
morality. Nor have we yet seen analyses of the morality of domestic-
ity that might reveal its inconsistencies. Furthermore, that morality 
may have been greatly subversive of other beliefs about the proper re-
lationship of men and women and of children and adults. 
Second, even if society had a reasonably coherent moral view of 
the family, could it have been transferred intact to the law without 
being fragmented by the pressures of precedent, by judicial recalci-
trance, by doubts about the proper scope of law, by concerns about the 
enforcement problem, by preferences for family autonomy, or by the 
interstitial character of family law? Were there not greater regional 
differences in family law than we have now, since there were greater 
regional differences and less national law? Could even a nationally 
coherent moral view of the family survive the fracturing force of the 
institutional structure of the law I described earlier in this paper?279 
And even if the law presented a coherent moral image of the family, 
did family law have enough prominence and authority to affect the 
way people thought about their families and themselves? If so, what 
social circumstances made that influence persuasive? What, if any-
thing, began to erode that influence? And with what consequences? 
Another approach to questions about the cultural purposes of fam-
ily law is psychological. In particular, concern about those purposes 
should lead us to ask more penetratingly what assumptions about 
human nature underlie family law generally and the trend toward di-
minished moral discourse particularly. Most basically, most tradition-
ally, most anachronistically, we may ask whether man is good or evil. 
More particularly, we may ask how man responds to the absence of 
social controls, how he reacts to a more spontaneous and active emo-
tional life, what the nature of his need for privacy is, to what extent his 
behavior may be deliberately reformed, to what extent he needs aspira-
tions beyond himself and attachments to his community. 
A third approach to questions about the cultural purposes of fam-
ily law is sociological. Of course, to ask about the cultural purpose of 
279. See notes 74-81 supra and accompanying text. 
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family law is to raise questions that are all in a basic sense sociological. 
But in asking about the use of family law in creating and sustaining 
culture we will find ourselves asking provocative and useful questions 
about the social and political functions that family law serves in this 
society. Is our society actually secularized or secularizing? What 
functions do family law issues serve in class conflicts in the United 
States? To what extent is it actually true that "the family" is a neces-
sary, or even desirable "building block" of society? To what extent 
can conscious social policy sustain "the family"? Does the family in 
fact need to be sustained? 
A final approach to questions about the cultural purposes of family 
law is philosophical. We will want to know not just what cultural 
functions family law can serve, but what cultural functions it should 
serve. Cultural coherence has costs, costs America has paid in the 
past, costs to which it has become sensitive. We need to ask in a sys-
tematic way, one that rises above the doctrinal divisions and rigidities 
of the law, which of those costs is worth paying. 
VI. CODA 
"And you, Mr. Arabin, what do you think?" said Eleanor .... 
"What do I think, Mrs. Bold? " and then he rumbled his money with 
his hands in his trowsers pockets, and looked and spoke very little like a 
thriving lover. "It is the bane of my life that on important subjects I 
acquire no fixed opinion. I think, and think, and go on thinking; and yet 
my thoughts are running ever in different directions. I hardly know 
whether or no we do lean more confidently than our fathers did on those 
high hopes to which we profess to aspire." 
"I think the world grows more worldly every day," said Eleanor. 
"That is because you see more of it than when you were younger. 
But we should hardly judge by what we see - we see so very very little." 
There was then a pause for a while, during which Mr. Arabin continued 
to turn over his shillings and half-crowns. 
- Anthony Trollope 
Barchester Towers (1857) 
In this paper, we have seen how family law has become ever more 
reluctant to discuss and resolve moral problems. We have seen that 
the trend has been impelled by legal, intellectual, and social attitudes 
of great strength and tenacity. We have noted forces that might re-
verse that trend, though we have discounted their strength. Finally, in 
the last section, we have glimpsed the troubling and intractable 
problems - legal, intellectual, and social - the trend ultimately 
raises. 
"So [said the doctor]. Now vee may perhaps to begin. Yes?" 
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